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Abstract
Term-generic rst-order logic, or simply generic rst-order logic
(GFOL), is presented as a rst-order logic parameterized with
terms dened axiomatically (rather than constructively), by re-
quiring them to only provide generic notions of free variable and
substitution satisfying reasonable properties. A complete Gentzen
deduction system is given, as well as complete equational and
many-sorted extensions. It is shown that various calculi with bind-
ing, such as λ-calculus and System F, can be faithfully dened
as GFOL theories. Since GFOL is complete, by dening a logic
or calculus as a GFOL theory one gets, at no additional effort, a
semantics for that logic or calculus. A fragment of GFOL called
Horn2 is also dened, on whose theories, under certain conditions,
the generic Gentzen deduction system is equivalent to a simplied
deduction system which resembles the derivation system of the cal-
culi that we intend to explicitly capture. Consequently, GFOL and
especially its fragment Horn2 can serve as a foundational deni-
tional framework for other calculi and logics, providing these with
models and complete deduction.
1. Introduction
First-order logic (FOL) is one of the best-established logics in com-
puter science. The models of FOL, called rst-order structures, as
well as its complete Gentzen deduction system are well understood
and intuitive, thus making FOL an attractive formalism with many
applications in specication and verication of systems, data-bases,
automated reasoning, etc. Problems can be encoded as FOL theo-
ries, i.e., as sets of FOL formulae over corresponding operational
and relational symbols; then FOL provides, in a uniform way, ap-
propriate models together with complete deduction rules.
FOL does not allow variables to be bound in terms (but only
in formulae, via quantiers), thus providing a straightforward no-
tion of substitution in terms. On the other hand, most calculi that
are used in the domain of programming languages, and not only, are
crucially based on the notion of binding of variables in terms: terms
export only a subset of their variables, their free variables, that
can be substituted. Because of their complex formulation for terms,
these calculi cannot be naturally dened as FOL theories. Conse-
quently, they need to dene their own models and deduction rules,
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and to state their own theorems of completeness, not always easy to
prove. In other words, they are presented as entirely new logics, as
opposed to theories in an existing logic, thus incurring all the draw-
backs (and boredom) of repeating denitions and proofs following
generic, well-understood patterns, but facing new details.
In this paper we dene term-generic rst-order logic, or simply
generic rst-order logic (GFOL), as a rst-order logic parameter-
ized by any terms that come with abstract notions of free variable
and substitution. More precisely, in GFOL terms are elements in a
generic set Term including a subset Var whose elements are called
variables, that comes with functions FV : Term → Pf (Var) and
Subst( , ) : Term × TermVar → Term for free variables and sub-
stitution, respectively, that satisfy some expected properties. GFOL
models provide interpretations of terms that satisfy, again, some
reasonable properties. A main result of this paper shows that GFOL
admits a complete Gentzen-like deduction system, which is syntac-
tically very similar to that of FOL; its proof of completeness mod-
ies the classic proof of completeness for FOL to use the generic
notions of term, free variables, substitutions and their generic prop-
erties. Extensions of GFOL with equality and with multiple sorts
are also dened and discussed.
By not committing to any particular denition of term, GFOL
can be instanciated to different types of terms, such as, e.g., stan-
dard FOL terms, or λ-terms, or different categories of typed λ-
terms, etc. When instanciated to standard FOL terms, GFOL be-
comes, as expected, precisely FOL. However, when instanciated to
more complex terms, e.g., the terms of λ-calculus, GFOL becomes
a framework to dene calculi over those terms. In the case of λ-
calculus, e.g., one can dene the common (β), (η), (ξ), (ext) as
GFOL (equational) axioms, thus comprising different variants of
λ-calculus as different, formal GFOL (equational) theories.
One can use GFOL as a denitional framework for a calculus
or logic L in at least two interesting ways: model theoretically and
proof theoretically. In the rst case, GFOL provides a complete
deduction system for the desired semantics of L, while in the
second case GFOL provides models that make a desired derivation
system complete. Let us detail these for a logic with equality:
 Model theoretical approach. One starts with the syntax (and so
the terms) and some desired models of L, which give a semantic
notion of truth |=L T1 = T2; then one denes a GFOL theory, say
ThL, by dening intuitive axioms of L using the GFOL syntax 
e.g., the GFOL formulae for (η) and (ext) in λ-calculus can be
∀y.(λx.yx) = y and
∀y1, y2.(∀x.y1x = y2x)⇒ y1 =y2;
then one shows that there is a good semantic relationship between
the models of L and the implicit GFOL models of ThL  in the case
of λ, FOL and equational logics, this is a bijection, but in general it
sufces to be a bijection only up to elementary equivalence, which
is actually the case for System F; from these, one can deduce that
|=L T1 =T2 iff ThL |=GFOL ∀FV(T1, T2).T1=T2, so the implicit
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complete deduction system of GFOL gives a complete derivation
system for L.
 Proof theoretical approach. One starts with the syntax and the
derivation rules of L (that one would like to be complete for some
appropriate notion of model), which yield a notion of derivability
`L T1 = T2; then, like in the model theoretical approach, one
denes a GFOL theory ThL and then one shows that `L T1 =T2 iff
ThL `GFOL T1 = T2; now one can deduce that the GFOL models
of ThL are complete for L, in other words, one can borrow from
GFOL a semantics forLwhich makes the desired derivation system
of L complete. We use this approach to obtain alternative (to those
in [13]) complete models for System F, which are not isomorphic
to those in [13]; what makes this novel result interesting is that it
follows as a consequence of more general, System-F-independent
results.
For both the model theoretical and the proof theoretical ap-
proaches above, the most difcult part is to ensure that ThL
captures precisely the desired axioms and derivation rules of
L. Additionally, in practice one may not like the fact that the
generic Gentzen proof system of GFOL has a different granu-
larity level than the derivation in L, because, for the same for-
mula, its proof tree in GFOL looks different than its derivation
tree in L. To ameliorate these inconveniences, we consider a frag-
ment of GFOL, called Horn2 because its sentences have the form
∀y.(∀x.Vni=1ai(x, y) ⇒ bi(x, y)) ⇒ c(y) with ai, bi, c are
atomic formulae (x and y denote tuples of variables), i.e., gen-
eralized Horn implications whose conditions are themselves Horn
implications, and show that, under reasonable syntactic restric-
tions, the generic GFOL Gentzen system on ThL is equivalent to a
derivation system of the form
Γ, ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T ) for any i = 1 . . . n
Γ . c(T )
where z is a fresh tuple of variables replacing x, and T is a
tuple of terms substituting y. In particular, the GFOL formula
corresponding to (ext) in λ-calculus on the previous page (i = 1
and a1 is true), is equivalent to the derivation rule
Γ . T1z = T2z
Γ . T1 = T2
, where z is fresh,
which has a zero-representational-distance to the usual rule of
extensionality. Typing rules fall under the same pattern, e.g.,
Γ, typeOf (z, t) . typeOf (T, t′)
Γ . typeOf (λz : t.T, t→ t′) , where z is fresh w.r.t. Γ.
(Above, we viewed the type declaration z : t as an atomic formula
typeOf (z, t), of the same category with typeOf (λz : t.T, t → t′) ;
note that the freshness assumption coincides with the usual require-
ment that x does not occur on a left-hand side of a type declaration
in Γ, in order to avoid conicts.) All the (typed or untyped) log-
ics and calculi with binding operators on terms that we are aware
of have derivation rules as above, so they fall into the Horn2 frag-
ment of GFOL. Consequently, these logics and calculi can be au-
tomatically encoded as theories in GFOL, which hereby provides
them with appropriate models and completeness theorems. More-
over, formal Horn2 proof trees can be regarded as derivation trees
for the encoded logic.
Related work. The term-generic logic proposed here captures both
the syntactic models for λ-calculus in [10] and the frame structures
for type theory in [9]. We are not aware of any generalization of
rst-order logic that copes with generic terms having similar struc-
ture or purposes with the one that we propose here. Among set-
theoretic approaches to related problems, we mention the structures
built of explicitly closed families and functionals of [1], that were
studied under the name binding algebras in [17]. Strictly speaking,
the notions of term in these frameworks form term syntaxes in our
sense, and binding algebras are particular cases of models in our
sense. However, such a comparison is not accurate because binding
algebras (and in particular Frege structures of [1]) try to capture
algebraically both logical connectors and quantiers. The binding
terms dened in [17] generalize rst-order terms by allowing oper-
ators that can bind some of the variables. There are three important
differences between that framework and ours: (1) the terms con-
sidered there still have concrete (second-order) structure; (2) that
framework is by default extensional; (3) the results concern equa-
tional logic only.
The paper [4] treats substitution abstractly like we do, but re-
quires models to account for substitution in a direct way; therefore
they need to work in a presheaf topos different from Set as the
universe of types, in order for elements in models to be families of
items, sensitive to the change of context/environment. While their
substitution algebras are related to our term syntaxes, models dif-
fer in that we do not require them to have built in abstract syntax
on their carrier sets, but rather to be able to provide interpretations
for all syntactic features. This is because our purposes are logical
rather than algebraic; in particular, we do not aim for any kind of
higher-order initial algebra semantics.
What clearly distinguishes our approach from all the mentioned
works, including those on syntactic λ-models and frames, is that we
do not commit to any functional/extensional aspects (postponing
them towards the specication stage), and consequently we do not
consider binding operators as rst-class citizens. Another specic
feature of this approach is that our logic is directly applicable
to typed calculi, with typing judgements that change the typing
context being captured by rst-order formulae.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
introduces GFOL (syntax, models and some properties). Section
3 presents specications of various λ-calculi in GFOL. Section
4 denes a Gentzen deductive system for GFOL and proves its
completeness. Section 6 discusses some instances of GFOL - FOL,
λ-calculi, System F, and a formula-typed logic - from a semantic
point of view. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Term-Generic First-Order Logic
We introduce a generic notion of rst-order term, axiomatized by
means of free variables and substitution, purposely not committing
to any concrete syntactic form of terms. Then we show that the
development of rst-order logic essentially depends only on the
properties of substitution. Additionally, various forms of typed
and untyped lambda-calculi naturally fall into our framework by
properly instanciating the generic notions of term and substitution.
2.1 Term Syntax
DEFINITION 1. Let Var be a countably innite set of variables. A
term syntax over Var consists of the following data:
(a) A countably innite set Term such that Var ⊆ Term,
whose elements are called terms;
(b) A mapping FV : Term → Pf (Var); elements of FV(T )
are called free variables, or simply variables, of T ;
(c) A mapping Subst : Term× TermVar → Term.
This data is subject to the following requirements (where x, T, T ′,
θ, θ′ denote arbitrary variables, terms, and elements of TermVar →
Term, respectively):
(1) Subst(x, θ) = θ(x);
(2) Subst(T, 1Var) = T ;1
1 Here and elsewhere, by language abuse, we let 1Var denote the inclusion
mapping of Var into Term.
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(3) If θFV (T )= θ′FV (T ), then Subst(T, θ) = Subst(T ′, θ);
(4) Subst(Subst(T, θ), θ′) = Subst(T, θ; θ′), where for
each x ∈ Var, (θ; θ′)(x) is, by denition, Subst(θ(x), θ′);
(5) FV (x) = {x};
(6) FV (Subst(T, θ)) =
S{FV (θ(x)) :x ∈ FV (T )}.
Note that we assume the notion of term coming together with a no-
tion of substitution which is composable (condition (4) above).
Therefore, in our examples of calculi with bindings, we shall
consider α-equivalence classes of terms rather than bare terms,
a reasonable assumption when working at the logical, and not
the implementation, level. For distinct variables x1, . . . , xn, we
write [T1/x1, . . . , Tn/xn] for the function Var → Term that
maps each xi to Ti and all the other variables to themselves, and
T [T1/x1, . . . , Tn/xn] for Subst(T, [T1/x1, . . . , Tn/xn]).
PROPOSITION 1. The following hold:
(1) x 6∈ FV(T ) implies T [T ′/x] = T ;
(2) y[T/x] = T if y = x and y[T/x] = y otherwise;
(3) FV(T [T ′/x]) = FV(T ) \ {x} ∪ FV(T ′);
(4) T [y/x][z/y] = T [z/x] if y 6∈ FV(T );
(5) T [y/x][x/y] = T if y 6∈ FV(T ).
Proof: We shall tacitly use properties (1)-(6) in Denition 1.
(1) Assume x 6∈ FV(T ). Since [T ′/x] FV(T )= 1Var FV(T ), we
obtain T [T ′/x] = Subst(T, 1Var) = T .
(2) If y = x then y[T/x] = Subst(x, [T/x]) = [T/x](x) =
T . If y 6= x then [T/x]FV(y)= 1VarFV(y), thus y[T/x] =
Subst(y, 1Var) = y.
(3) FV(T [T ′/x]) = FV(Subst(T, [T ′/x])) =S{FV([T ′/x](y)) : y ∈ FV(T )} =S{FV([T ′/x](x)) : x ∈ FV(T )} ∪ S{FV([T ′/x](y)) : y ∈
FV(T ), y 6= x} = FV(T ′) ∪ (FV(T ) \ {x}).
Above, we also applied point (2) of the current proposition.
(4) We have that T [y/x][z/y] = Subst(Subst(T, [y/x]), [z/y]) =
Subst(T, [y/x]; [z/y]). Now, for each u ∈ Var, we have that:
([y/x]; [z/y])(u) = Subst([y/x](u), [z/y]) =
=

Subst(y, [z/y]) , if u = x
Subst(u, [z/y]) , if u 6= x =
=
8<: z, if u = xz, if u 6= x and u = yu, if u 6= x and u 6= y =
=

z, if u = x or u = y
u, if u 6= x and u 6= y
Hence, since y 6∈ FV(T ), it follows that [y/x][z/y] FV(T )=
[z/x]FV(T ), implying Subst(T, [y/x]; [z/y]) = Subst(T, [z/x]).
(5) It follows by point (4), since Subst(T, [x/x]) = T . 
2.2 First-Order Logic over a Term Syntax
DEFINITION 2. A generic rst-order language consists of the fol-
lowing:
• A countably innite set Var, of variables;
• A term syntax Term over Var;
• A countable ranked set Π = (Πn)n∈IN , of relation symbols.
DEFINITION 3. A model is a triple (A, (AT )T∈Term, (Api)pi∈Π),
such that:
(a) A is a set, the carrier set;
(b) For each pi ∈ Πn, Api is an n-ary relation on A;
(c) For each T ∈ Term, AT is a mapping AVar → A such that:
(i) Ax(ρ) = ρ(x);
(ii) ASubst(T, θ)(ρ) = AT (Aθ(ρ)), where for each θ ∈ TermVar,
Aθ : A
Var → AVar is dened by Aθ(ρ)(x) = Aθ(x)(ρ);
(iii) For each ρ and ρ′ such that ρFV(T )= ρ′ FV(T ), it holds
that AT (ρ) = AT (ρ′).
Note that, unlike in the clasical FOL setting where interpretation
of terms is built from operations, in GFOL models the interpreta-
tion of terms is assumed (pretty much like in the case of Henkin
models for the simply-typed λ-calculus). However thanks to the
axioms ruling these interpretations, when particularized to FOL,
GFOL yields essentially the same models, as we show later in Sec-
tion 6.1
Term can be organized as a model (Term, (TermT )T∈Term,
(Termpi)pi∈Π) in many ways, corresponding to the choice of rela-
tions Termpi , by letting TermT (ρ) be Subst(T, ρ). These are indeed
models, since conditions (i)-(iii) from the model denition coincide
in this case with (1), (4) and (3) in the term syntax denition. Any
such model will be henceforth called a Herbrand model. If one
denes model homomorphisms as expected, then one gets that the
Herbrand model with all relations empty is initial in the category
of models and model homomorphisms. However, we shall not be
interested in such categorical/algebraic aspects here.
Above, and from now on, we let x, xi, y, u, v, etc., range over
variables, T, Ti, T ′, etc., over terms, ρ, ρ′, etc., over valuations in
AVar, and pi, pi′, etc., over relation symbols. Formulae are dened
the usual way, starting from atomic formulae pi(T1, . . . , Tn) and
applying connectives ∧,⇒,¬ and quantier ∀. We let Formula
denote the set of formulae. For each formula ϕ, the setAϕ ⊆ AVar,
of valuations that make ϕ true in A, is dened recursively on the
structure of formulae as follows:
• ρ ∈ Api(T1,...,Tn) iff (AT1(ρ), . . . , ATn(ρ)) ∈ Api;
• ρ ∈ A¬ϕ iff ρ 6∈ Aϕ;
• ρ ∈ Aϕ∧ψ iff ρ ∈ Aϕ and ρ ∈ Aψ;
• ρ ∈ Aϕ⇒ψ iff ρ ∈ Aϕ implies ρ ∈ Aψ;
• ρ ∈ A∀x.ϕ iff ρ[x← a] ∈ Aϕ for all a ∈ A.
Satisfaction of a formula ϕ by a model A under a valuation ρ :
Var→ A, written A |=ρ ϕ, is dened as ρ ∈ Aϕ; satisfaction of a
formula ϕ by a model A, written A |= ϕ, is dened as A |=ρ ϕ for
each ρ ∈ Aϕ, i.e., as AVar = Aϕ. Above, and from now on, we let
ϕ, χ, ψ range over arbitrary formulae and A over arbitrary models.
DEFINITION 4. For each formula ϕ, the set FV(ϕ), of its free
variables, is dened recursively as follows:
• FV(pi(T1, . . . , Tn)) = FV(T1) ∪ . . . ∪ FV(Tn);
• FV(¬ϕ) = FV(ϕ);
• FV(ϕ ∧ ψ) = FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(ψ);
• FV(ϕ⇒ ψ) = FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(ψ);
• FV(∀x.ϕ) = FV(ϕ) \ {x}.
Note that, since FV(T ) is nite for each term T , FV(ϕ) is also
nite for each formula ϕ.
DEFINITION 5. Substitution of terms for variables in formulae,
written as a function Subst : Formula × TermVar → Formula, is
dened as follows.
• Subst(pi(T1, . . . , Tn), θ) = pi(Subst(T1, θ), . . . , Subst(Tn, θ));
• Subst(¬ϕ, θ) = ¬Subst(ϕ, θ);
• Subst(ϕ ∧ ψ, θ) = Subst(ϕ, θ) ∧ Subst(ψ, θ);
• Subst(ϕ⇒ ψ, θ) = Subst(ϕ, θ)⇒ Subst(ψ, θ);
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• Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ) = ∀z.Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z]), where z is the least
variable2 not in FV(ϕ) ∪S{θ(y) : y ∈ FV(ϕ)}.
DEFINITION 6. α-equivalence of formulae, written ≡α, is dened
to be the least relation R ⊆ Formula × Formula satisfying the
following properties:
• pi(T1, . . . , Tn) R pi(T1, . . . , Tn);
• ¬ϕ R ¬ψ if ϕ R ψ;
• ϕ ∧ ϕ′ R ψ ∧ ψ′ if ϕ R ψ and ϕ′ R ψ′;
• ϕ⇒ ϕ′ R ψ ⇒ ψ′ if ϕ R ψ and ϕ′ R ψ′;
• ∀x.ϕ R ∀y.ψ if ϕ[z/x] R ψ[z/y] for some z 6∈ FV(ϕ) ∪
FV(ψ).
For the following proposition, recall the denitions, for a model
A and two mappings θ, θ′ : Var → Term, of the composition
θ; θ′ : Var → Term and of the mapping Aθ : AVar → AVar:
• (θ; θ′)(x) = Subst(θ(x), θ′);
• Aθ(ρ)(x) = Aθ(x)(ρ).
PROPOSITION 2. The following hold:
(1) If ρFV(ϕ)= ρ′FV(ϕ), then ρ ∈ Aϕ iff ρ′ ∈ Aϕ;
(2) ρ ∈ ASubst(ϕ, θ) iff Aθ(ρ) ∈ Aϕ;
(3) ϕ ≡α ψ implies Aϕ = Aψ;
(4) ϕ ≡α ψ implies FV(ϕ) = FV(ψ);
(5) ≡α is an equivalence;
(6) ϕ ≡α Subst(ϕ, 1Var);
(7) y 6∈ FV(ϕ) implies ϕ[y/x][z/y] ≡α ϕ[z/x];
(8) x 6∈ FV(ϕ) implies ϕ[T/x] ≡α ϕ;
(9) ϕ ≡α ψ implies Subst(ϕ, θ) ≡α Subst(ψ, θ);
(10) θFV(ϕ)= θ′FV(ϕ) implies Subst(ϕ, θ) ≡α Subst(ϕ, θ′);
(11) Subst(ϕ, θ; θ′) ≡α Subst(Subst(ϕ, θ), θ′);
(12) ϕ ≡α ϕ′ and ψ ≡α ψ′ implies: ¬ϕ ≡α ¬ϕ′, ϕ∧ψ ≡α
ϕ′ ∧ ψ′, ϕ⇒ ψ ≡α ϕ′ ⇒ ψ′, ∀x.ϕ ≡α ∀x.ϕ′.
Proof: We shall tacitly use properties (1)-(6) in the denition of a
term syntax and properties (c).(i-iii) in the denition of models. All
proofs, except the one of point (12), will be performed by induction
either on the structure of formulae, or on the structure of≡α; (IH)
will stand for the Induction Hypothesis. Each time, we shall skip
the case of logical connectors ¬,∧,⇒, since the induction step is
trivial for them.
We prove (1) and (2) by induction on the structure of ϕ.
(1) Base case. ρFV(T1,...,Tn)= ρ′FV(T1,...,Tn) implies
ρTi= ρ′Ti for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, which implies
ATi(ρ) = ATi(ρ
′) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, which implies that
ρ ∈ Aϕ iff ρ′ ∈ Aϕ.
Induction step. Assume ρFV(∀x.ϕ)= ρ′FV(∀x.ϕ). Then
ρFV(ϕ)\{x}= ρ′FV(ϕ)\{x}, hence for all a ∈ A, ρ[x← a]FV(ϕ)=
ρ′[x← a] FV(ϕ). By (IH), we get that for all a ∈ A, ρ[x ←
a] ∈ Aϕ iff ρ′[x ← a] ∈ Aϕ, in particular that ρ ∈ A∀x.ϕ iff
ρ′ ∈ A∀x.ϕ.
(2) Base case. We have the following equivalencies:
ρ ∈ ASubst(pi(T1, . . . , Tn), θ) iff
ρ ∈ Api(Subst(T1, θ),...,Subst(Tn, θ)) iff
(ASubst(T1, θ)(ρ), . . . , ASubst(Tn, θ)(ρ)) ∈ Api iff
(AT1(Aθ(ρ)), . . . , ATn(Aθ(ρ))) ∈ Api iff
Aθ(ρ) ∈ Api(T1,...,Tn).
Induction step. We have the following equivalencies:
2 One may interpret the least as having the least index, where we
assume an indexing on the (countable) set of variables; we pick the least
variable in order to make a choice - any variable with the mentioned
property would do.
ρ ∈ Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ) iff
ρ ∈ A∀z.Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z]) (where z is the least variable not in
FV(ϕ) ∪S{θ(y) : y ∈ FV(ϕ)})3 iff
ρ[z ← a] ∈ ASubst(ϕ, θ[x← z]) for all a ∈ A, iff (by (IH))
Aθ[x←z](ρ[z ← a]) ∈ Aϕ for all a ∈ A, iff (as will be proved
shortly)
Aθ(ρ)[x← a] ∈ Aϕ for all a ∈ A, iff
Aθ(ρ) ∈ A∀x.ϕ.
It remains to prove the promised equivalence. For it, it would
sufce that Aθ[x←z](ρ[z ← a])FV(ϕ)= Aθ(ρ)[x← a]FV(ϕ). To
prove the latter, let y ∈ FV(ϕ). Then
Aθ[x←z](ρ[x← a])(y) = Aθ[x←z](y)(ρ[x← a]) =
=

Aθ(y)(ρ[z ← a]), if x 6= y
Az(ρ[z ← a]), if x = y =
=

Aθ(y)(ρ[z ← a]), if x 6= y
a, if x = y.
On the other hand,
Aθ(ρ)[x← a](y) =

Aθ(y)(ρ), if x 6= y
a, if x = y.
Finally, we need to argue that ρ[z ← a]FV(θ(y))= ρFV(θ(y)) - this
is true because, by the choice of z, z 6∈ FV(θ(y)).
Points (3)-(11) will be proved by induction on the structure of
≡α.
(3): Base case. Obvious, since here ≡α coincides with equality.
Induction step. Assume ∀x.ϕ ≡α ∀y.ψ. Then ϕ[z/x] ≡α
ψ[z/y] for some z 6∈ FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(ψ). We have the following
equivalencies:
ρ ∈ A∀x.ϕ iff
ρ[x← a] ∈ Aϕ for all a ∈ A, iff (as will be proved shortly)
A[z/x](ρ[z ← a]) ∈ Aϕ for all a ∈ A, iff (by point (2))
ρ[z ← a] ∈ Aϕ[z/x] for all a ∈ A, iff (by (IH))
ρ[z ← a] ∈ Aψ[z/x] for all a ∈ A, iff
ρ ∈ A∀x.ψ .
It remains to prove the promised equivalence. According to
point (1), it would sufce that ρ[x← a]FV(ϕ)= A[z/x](ρ[z ← a])FV(ϕ).
To prove the latter, let y ∈ FV(ϕ). Then
ρ[x← a](y) =
a, if y = x
ρ(y), if y 6= x.
On the other hand,
A[z/x](ρ[z ← a])(y) = A[z/x](y)(ρ[z ← a]) =
=

Az(ρ[z ← a]), if y = x
Ay(ρ[z ← a]), if y 6= x =
=

a, if y = x
ρ[z ← a](y), if y 6= x.
And since z 6∈ FV(ϕ), ρ(y) = ρ[z ← a](y).
(4): Base case. Obvious, since here ≡α coincides with equality.
Induction step. Assume ∀x.ϕ ≡α ∀y.ψ, i.e., that ϕ[z/x] ≡α
ψ[z/y] for some z 6∈ FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(ψ). By (IH), FV(ϕ[z/x]) =
FV(ψ[y/z]), hence, by Proposition 1.(3), FV(ϕ) \ {x} ∪ {z} =
FV(ψ) \ {x} ∪ {z}; because z 6∈ FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(ψ), this implies
FV(ϕ) \ {x} = FV(ψ) \ {x}, i.e., FV(∀x.ϕ) = FV(∀x.ψ).
3 From now on, whenever we need to consider such a variable z, we just
render it as the variable from the denition of substitution.
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Points (5)-(11) shall be proved together. In the case of (5), we
prove by induction two properties - reexivity and transitivity -
since symmetry holds by denition.
Base case.
(5) Reexivity and transitivity follow from the corresponding prop-
erties of equality.
(6) Subst(pi(T1, . . . , Tn), 1Var) = pi(Subst(T1, 1Var), . . . ,
Subst(Tn, 1Var)) = pi(T1, . . . , Tn), and thus
Subst(pi(T1, . . . , Tn, 1Var) ≡α pi(T1, . . . , Tn).
(7) and (8): Follow similarly to (6), but also using Proposition 1,
points (4) and (1), respectively.
(9) Obvious, since here ≡α is the equality.
(10) and (11): Follow similarly to (6), using properties (3) and (9)
in the denition of a term syntax.
Induction step:
(5) For reexivity, note that ∀x.ϕ ≡α ∀x.ϕ holds because,
by (IH) for point (5), ϕ[z/x] ≡α ϕ[z/x]. In order to prove
transitivity, assume that ∀x1.ϕ1 ≡α ∀x2.ϕ2 and ∀x2.ϕ2 ≡α
∀x3.ϕ3. Then for some z 6∈ FV(ϕ1) ∪ FV(ϕ2) and z′ 6∈
FV(ϕ2) ∪ FV(ϕ3), it holds that ϕ1[z/x1] ≡α ϕ2[z/x2] and
ϕ2[z
′/x2] ≡α ϕ3[z′/x3]. Let z′′ 6∈ FV(ϕ1) ∪ FV(ϕ2) ∪ FV(ϕ3).
Then, by (IH) for points (7) and (9), we have the following
chain of α-equivalencies: ϕ1[z′′/x1] ≡α ϕ1[z/x1][z′′/z] ≡α
ϕ2[z/x2][z
′′/z] ≡α ϕ2[z′′/x1] ≡α . . . ≡α ϕ3[z′′/x3]. From
this, by (IH) for point (5), we get ϕ1[z′′/x1] ≡α ϕ3[z′′/x3];
thus we found the desired z′′ 6∈ FV(ϕ1) ∪ FV(ϕ3), yielding
∀x1.ϕ1 ≡α ∀x3.ϕ3.
(6) We need to prove that Subst(∀x.ϕ, 1Var) ≡α ∀x.ϕ, i.e., that
∀z.ϕ[z/x] ≡α ∀x.ϕ with z as in the denition of substitution. Let
z′ 6∈ FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(ϕ[z/x]), or equivalently, z′ 6∈ FV(ϕ) ∪ {z}.
Then, by (IH) for point (7), ϕ[z/x][z′/z] ≡α ϕ[z′/x] and we are
done.
(7) We need to prove that if y 6∈ FV(ϕ), then (∀u.ϕ)[y/x][z/y] ≡α
(∀u.ϕ)[z/x], i.e., ∀u′′.ϕ[u′/u][y/x][u′′/u][z/y] ≡α
∀u′′′.ϕ[u′′′/u][z/x], where u′, u′′, u′′′ are as in the denition
of substitution for each of the three cases. Let v 6∈ FV(ϕ) ∪
{u′, u′′, u′′′}. It would sufce thatϕ[u′/u][y/x][u′′/u′][z/y][v/u′′]
≡α ϕ[u′′′/u][z/x]v/u′′′]; the latter is true by (IH) for point (11),
since [u′/u]; [y/x]; [u′′/u′]; [z/y]; [v/u′′] = [u′′′/u]; [z/x]; [v/u′′′].
(8) We need to show that if T 6∈ FV(∀u.ϕ), then (∀u.ϕ)[T/x] ≡α
∀u.ϕ, i.e., that ∀z.Subst(ϕ, [T/x][u← z]) ≡α ∀u.ϕ, where z is as
in the denition of substitution. Let z′ 6∈ FV(ϕ)∪{z}∪FV(T ). It
would sufce that Subst(ϕ, [T/x][u← z])[z′/z] ≡α ϕ[z′/u], i.e.,
by (IH) for point (11), that Subst(ϕ, [T/x][u← z]; [z′/z]) ≡α
Subst(ϕ, [z′/u]). The latter follows by (IH) for point (10), since
[T/x][u← z′]FV(ϕ)= [z′/u]FV(ϕ).
(9) Assume ∀x.ϕ ≡α ∀y.ψ, i.e., that ϕ[v/x] ≡α ψ[v/y] for
some v 6∈ FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(ψ). In order to prove Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ) ≡α
Subst(∀y.ψ, θ), we take z, z′ as in the denition of substitution and
show that ∀z.Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z]) ≡α ∀z′.Subst(ψ, θ[y ← z′]).
For proving the latter, using (IH) for point (11), we take z′′ 6∈
FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(ψ) and show that Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z]; [z′′/z]) ≡α
Subst(ψ, θ[y ← z′]; [z′′/z′]), i.e., that Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z′′]) ≡α
Subst(ψ, θ[y ← z′′]). Since [z′′/x]; θ[x ← z′′] = θ[x ← z′′] and
[z′′/y]; θ[y ← z′′] = θ[x ← z′′], we reduce the desired equiva-
lence to Subst(ϕ, [z′′/x]; θ[x← z′′]) ≡α
Subst(ψ, [z′′/y]; θ[y ← z′′]), and furthermore, by (IH) for point
(11), to Subst(ϕ[z′′/x], θ[x← z′′]) ≡α Subst(ψ[z′′/y], θ[y ← z′′]).
Now, by (IH) for point (7), we have thatϕ[z′′/x] ≡α ϕ[v/x][z′′/v]
≡α ψ[v/y][z′′/v] ≡α ψ[z′′/y]; moreover, by (IH) for point (10),
from θ[x← z′′]FV(ϕ[z′′/x])= θFV(ϕ[z′′/x]), we get
Subst(ϕ[z′′/x], θ[x← z′′]) ≡α Subst(ϕ[z′′/x], θ) and simi-
larly Subst(ψ[z′′/y], θ[y ← z′′]) ≡α Subst(ψ[z′′/y], θ). Now
by (IH) for point (5), we reduce what we need to prove to
Subst(ϕ[v/z], θ) = Subst(ϕ[v/y], θ), which holds by (IH) for
point (9).
(10) Assume θFV(∀x.ϕ)= θ′FV(∀x.ϕ). In order to prove that
Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ) ≡α Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ′), note rst that the variable z
in the denition of substitution is the same in the two cases, and we
need to show ∀z.Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z]) ≡α ∀z.Subst(ϕ, θ′[x← z]),
i.e., by (IH) for point (11), that Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z]; [z′/z]) ≡α
Subst(ϕ, θ′[x← z]; [z′/z]), i.e., that Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z′]) ≡α
Subst(ϕ, θ′[x← z′]). The latter is true by (IH) for point (10), since
θ[x← z′]FV(ϕ)= θ′[x← z′]FV(ϕ).
(11) In order to prove that Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ; θ′) ≡α
Subst(Subst(∀x.ϕ, θ), θ′), let z, z′, z′′ as in the denition of sub-
stitution (for each of the three involved substitutions). We need to
show that ∀z.Subst(ϕ, (θ; θ′)[x← z]) ≡α
∀z′′.Subst(Subst(ϕ[x← z′], θ), θ′[z′ ← z′′]), i.e., that
Subst(ϕ, (θ; θ′)[x← z])[z′′′/z]] ≡α
Subst(Subst(ϕ[x← z′], θ), θ′[z′ ← z′′])[z′′′/z′′], where z′′′ 6∈
FV(ϕ) ∪ {z, z′, z′′}. Indeed, using (IH) for point (11) and the
freshness of z, z′, z′′, z′′′), we have the following chain of α-
equivalencies and equalities:
Subst(ϕ, (θ; θ′)[x← z])[z′′′/z] ≡α
Subst(ϕ, (θ; θ′)[x← z]; [z′′′/z]) ≡α
Subst(ϕ, (θ; θ′)[x← z′′′]) =
Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z′]; θ′[z′ ← z′′′]) =
Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z′]; θ′[z′ ← z′′]; [z′′′/z′′]) ≡α
Subst(ϕ, θ[x← z′]; θ′[z′ ← z′′])[z′′′/z′′],
which by (IH) for point (5) yield the desired result.
(12): The cases of logical connectors are obvious. Assume now
ϕ ≡α ϕ′. Then, by point (9), ϕ[z/x] ≡α ϕ′[z/x] for any x and z,
in particular ∀x.ϕ ≡α ∀x.ψ. 
Thus ≡α is an equivalence, preserves satisfaction and the free
variables, and is compatible with substitution, with language con-
structs, and with formula constructs (points (5), (3), (4), (9), (12)
in the above proposition). From now on, we shall identify formulae
modulo α-equivalence, since the mappings FV , Subst, A and the
ones that build formulae are well dened on equivalence classes.
(The notion of α-equivalence is crucial for the completeness of
cut-free Gentzen systems - see [18], page 67.) Note that GFOL is a
logic generic only w.r.t. terms - formulae are concrete rst-order
formulae over generic terms, with a concrete (and not generic)
notion of α-equivalence which imposes itself by the denition of
formulae, and which is determined by formula quantiers, having
nothing to do with any notion of term binding.
A generic rst-order language with equality is a generic rst-
order language that has an emphasized binary relation symbol =,
interpreted in all models as the equality relation. All the other
concepts remain the same.
Many-Sorted and Order-Sorted GFOL
The notions of a term syntax and term-generic rst-order languages
have rather straightforward many-sorted and order-sorted general-
izations. We next sketch an order-sorted version of GFOL, which
also covers the many-sorted case. Order-sorted GFOL generalizes
order-sorted equational logic [7].
Let S = (S,<) be a xed poset. Elements of S are called sorts,
and < is called the subsort relation. We assume that any two sorts
s, s′ having a common subsort (i.e., a sort s′′ with s′′ < s and
s′′ < s′), also have a greatest common subsort, denoted s ∧ s′. An
S-sorted set is a family of sets A = (As)s∈S such that As ⊆ As′
whenever s < s′. Let All(A) denote the set
S
s∈S As. We call A
unambiguous if As ∩ As′ = As∧s′ if s and s′ have a common
subsort, and As ∩ As′ = ∅ otherwise. Note that an unambiguous
S-sorted set A can be recovered from All(A) and the relation has
sort between elements of All(A) and S. Let A = (As)s∈S and
B = (Bs)s∈S be two S-sorted sets. A is included in B, written
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A ⊆ B, if As ⊆ Bs for all s ∈ S. An S-sorted mapping between
A and B is a family of mappings (hs : As → Bs)s∈S such that hs
is a restriction of hs′ whenever s < s′. Let Map(A,B) denote the
set of S-sorted mappings between A and B. For convenience, we
also dene the intersection between an S-sorted set A = (As)s∈S
and a set D, by A ∩D = (As ∩D)s∈S .
Let Var be an unambiguous, sortwise countably innite S-
sorted set of variables. An S-sorted term syntax over Var consists
of the following data:
(a) An unambiguous, sortwise countably innite S-sorted
set Term such that Var ⊆ Term;
(b) A mapping FV :All(Term)→ Pf (All(Var));
(c) A mapping Subst : All(Term) × All(Term)All(Var) →
All(Term) such that, for each s ∈ S, T ∈ Terms and
θ ∈ All(Term)All(Var), Subst(T, θ) ∈ Terms,
subject to the following requirements (where x, T, T ′, θ, θ′ denote
arbitrary variables, terms, and elements of All(Term)All(Var) respec-
tively):
(1) Subst(x, θ) = θ(x);
(2) Subst(T, 1All(Var)) = T ;
(3) If θFV (T )= θ′FV (T ), then Subst(T, θ) = Subst(T ′, θ);
(4) Subst(Subst(T, θ), θ′) = Subst(T, θ; θ′), where for
each x ∈ Var, (θ; θ′)(x) is, by denition, Subst(θ(x), θ′);
(5) FV (x) = {x};
(6) FV (Subst(T, θ)) =
S{FV (θ(x)) :x ∈ FV (T )}.
An S-sorted generic rst-order language consists of the fol-
lowing: an unambiguous, sortwise countably innite S-sorted set
Var; an S-sorted term syntax Term over Var; a countable S∗-ranked
set Π = (Πw)w∈S∗ , of relation symbols. A model is a triple
(A, (AT )T∈Term, (Api)pi∈Π) such that:
(a) A is an S-sorted set;
(b) For each pi ∈ Πs1...sn , Api ⊆ As1 × . . .×Asn ;
(c) For each T ∈ All(Term), AT is a mapping Map(Var, A) →
All(A) such that whenever T ∈ Terms, AT (ρ) ∈ As for all
ρ ∈ Map(Var, A) and:
(i) If x ∈ Vars, then Ax(ρ) = ρs(x);
(ii) ASubst(T, θ)(ρ) = AT (Aθ(ρ)), where for each θ ∈
All(Term)All(Var), Aθ : Map(Var, A) → Map(Var, A) is
dened by Aθ(ρ)s(x) = Aθ(x)(ρ) if x ∈ Vars;
(iii) For each ρ, ρ′ ∈ Map(Var, A) such that ρMap(Var,A)∩FV(T )=
ρ′Map(Var,A)∩FV(T ), it holds that AT (ρ) = AT (ρ′).
Now rst-order formulae are dened as usual, and they form
an S-sorted set. All the concepts and results about GFOL in this
paper, including completeness of various proof systems for various
fragments of the logic, can be easily (but admittedly tediously)
extended to the many-sorted and order-sorted cases.
3. Specications of Calculi in GFOL
Most of the calculi that we specify below were taken from the
monographs [15], [13] and [8]. For the untyped λ-calculus, see [2].
System F was independently introduced in [6] and [16]. For the
ML-style polymorphism, see [12]. A polymorphic calculus with
units of measurement was studied in [11]. Some of these calculi
have been given specic semantics (consisting of a notion of mod-
els and a completeness result); by regarding them as GFOL theo-
ries, we implicitly assign to these calculi a (complete) semantics in
a uniform way. That this uniform GFOL semantics tends to con-
form the specic ones will be argued in Section 5.
Below, terms are always considered up to α-equivalence, where
each time α-equivalence can be readily dened in terms of the
binding operators (it will be obvious in the below CF grammars
for describing terms which are the binding operators). Substitution
is also standard, and acts on terms up to α-equivalence. With
these conventions, specifying a term syntax amounts to giving a
CF grammar that describes the various syntactic categories, each
syntactic category consisting of terms of a certain sort. All theories
are inside the logic GFOL with equality.
We next recall some standard FOL notational conventions.
Since our framework has two kinds of bindings (in terms and in
formulae), we state these conventions explicitly, to avoid further
confusion:
1. Both terms and formulae are considered up to α-equivalence.
When an expression like λx. T appears in an axiom, λx is
assumed to bind any occurrence of x in T (note that λx.
is well-dened on α-equivalence classes, because T ≡α T ′
implies λx.T ≡α λx.T ′).
2. We shall use small letters, such as x, y, to denote variables,
and capital letters, such as X,Y , to denote terms. Let us call
metavariables these symbols that we use to denote variables
or terms. Metavariables for variables are subject to different
conventions from metavariables for terms. When two metavari-
ables x and y appear in the same axiom, we assume that
they denote some xed, but distinct variables; therefore an ax-
iom like x = λx.y x denotes a sole GFOL sentence, with
x, y ∈ Var, x 6= y (the choice of x and y is immaterial thanks
to α-equivalence of formulae, since we assume an outer uni-
versal quantication - see convention 3). On the other hand, a
metavariable X denotes an arbitrary term, thus an axiom like
(λx.X)Y = X[Y/x] is actually an axiom scheme denoting a
set of formulae, one for each pair of terms (X,Y ); moreover,
when X and Y appear in the same axiom (like above), they are
not assumed to be distinct.
3. Axioms denote formulae or sets of formulae. These formulae
are in turn identied with the sentences that are their universal
closures, i.e., that quantify universally over all the free variables
of the formulae. Therefore a more rigorous way to write x =
λx.y x and (λx.X)y = X[y/x] is ∀x.∀y.x = λx.y x and
∀z.(λx.X)y = X[y/x] where z is the tuple of all variables
free in (λx.X)y = X[y/x].
4. Term- and formula- binding operators are assumed to bind as
far as they can: thus λx.x + x should be read as λx.(x + x)
and ∀x.ϕ ∧ ψ as ∀x.(ϕ ∧ ψ); the logical conjunction ∧ binds
stronger than the implication⇒.
When do we use variables and when terms? We use terms
when there is no way to express the desired axiom as a single
sentence. It turns out that axioms like the η-rule, classically stated
as E = λx.E x with the side condition x 6∈ FV(E), can be
simply written as x = λx.y x in GFOL; indeed, the fact that y
is independent of x is captured by the way substitution is dened
on (α-equivalencies of) terms. On the other hand, the β-rule cannot
be written as a single formula, being inherently an axiom scheme.
3.1 Untyped λ-Calculus (Uλ)
• Unsorted
• Term ::= Var | Term Term | λVar.Term
• No relation symbol (except equality)
Here x, y andX,Y range over variables and terms, respectively.
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(∀x.X = Y )⇒ λx.X = λx.Y (ξ)
(λx.X)x = X (β)
x = λy.x y (η)
Remarks:
• The very simple syntax of the (β)-rule stated above may seem
strange at rst sight. However, it has a good underlying intu-
ition: a function λx.X(x) applied to a value x yields X(x)
- in the latter X(x), the value x has substituted the vari-
able, i.e., the formal parameter, x. It is common mathematical
practice to let the same symbol denote both the formal and the
actual parameter. This brings no inconsistency, because in the
equation (λx.X)x = X , all occurrences of x in the rst X
are bound by λ, while the other occurrences are bound by the
outer universal quantier of the equation. Thus if we substitute
a term Y for x in this equation we get the more conventional β-
rule (λx.X)Y = X[Y/x]. One may replace the (β) axiom by
(λx.X)y = X[y/x], or even by (λx.X)Y = X[Y/x]; how-
ever, we nd the current form of (β) quite elegant and compact.
• If one wants to dene non-extensional λ-calculus, then one can
simply remove the (η) axiom.
3.2 (Simply-)Typed λ-Calculus (Tλ)
• Two sorts, type and data
• Var = (Vartype,Vardata) = (TVar,DVar)
• Term = (Termtype, Termdata) = (TTerm,DTerm), where
TTerm ::= TVar | TConst | TTerm→ TTerm
DTerm ::= DVar | DTerm DTerm | λDVar : TTerm.DTerm
• One relation symbol, typeOf : data× type
Here x, y, X,Y , t, t′, and T, T ′ range over data variables, data
terms, type variables, and type terms, respectively. This convention
will apply to all specications extending this one. For clarity, we
enclose labels of typing formulae by square brackets (e.g., [App]),
and labels of equational rules by parentheses (e.g., (β)).
(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ typeOf (X, t′))⇒
typeOf (λx : t.X, t→ t′) [Abs]
typeOf (x, t→ t′) ∧ typeOf (y, t)⇒
typeOf (x y, t′) [App]
(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ X = Y )⇒
λx : t.X = λx : t.Y
(ξ)
typeOf ((λx : t.X)x, t′)⇒
(λx : t.X)x = X
(β)
typeOf (λy : t.x y, t′)⇒
x = λy : t.x y
(η)
Remarks:
• One usually also considers, besides the basic types, such as nat
and bool (which are elements of TConst), some data constants,
such as 0, succ, +, or ifThenElseFi, with their assigned types
(e.g., typeOf (+, nat → nat → nat)) and dening equations
(e.g., x + succ(y) = succ(x + y)). To save space, we did
not include these in our specication, nor we shall include such
straightforward items in later specications.
• The axioms [Abs] and (ξ) show that rules changing the typ-
ing context can be modelled using rst-order formulae more
general than Horn. Semantically, such an approach is clean; for
instance, [Abs] says that we can type λx : t.X to t → t′ when-
ever X has type t′ for any value of its argument x of type t.
Syntactically, this approach simplies the calculus, since it al-
lows one to focus on the actual meaning of axioms rather than
on low-level details such as how to deal with typing contexts,
free or fresh variables, etc.
• We allow type variables and quantify them in formulae, but
this fact alone does not bring polymorphism, since we do not
have abstraction over types. We can nevertheless use type vari-
ables to reason about types in general, which is not possible
in simply-typed λ-calculus, so the GFOL specication above is
slightly more powerful than simply-typed λ-calculus. We could
have also specied the calculus more accurately by allowing an
innite set of sorts, each sort representing a derived type. How-
ever, we prefer to work with the current specication, which is
more easily extendable.
• Standard denitions of simply-typed λ-calculus make use
of typing contexts. Our GFOL denitions above does not
make typing contexts explicit; they appear implicitly dur-
ing the derivation process. A typing judgement of the form
x1 :T1, . . . , xn :Tn . X : T in the type-theoretic notation can
be seen as syntactic sugar for ∀x1, . . . , xn.typeOf (x1, T1) ∧
typeOf (xn, Tn) ⇒ typeOf (X,T ). Because of the GFOL
equality axioms, we allow equations between data terms which
are not necessarily well-typed. For example, X = X holds re-
gardless of whether X is well-typed. However, the conditions
in equations make sure that we cannot deduce any equation
X = Y , with X well-typed and Y non-well-typed. A typed
equation of the form x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn . X = Y : T can
be seen as syntactic sugar for (∀x1, . . . , xn.typeOf (x1, T1) ∧
typeOf (xn, Tn))⇒ typeOf (X,T ) ∧ typeOf (Y, T ) ∧X = Y .
• Since compatibility of typeOf with equality is a built-in prop-
erty of GFOL, our specication enjoys the type preservation
property (types are preserved by equalities) by default. That this
property can be proved as a theorem in simply-typed λ-calculus
ensures the correctness of our specication. Note however that
in general a property like type preservation is seen as a test for
a calculus to be sound. If one wants to actually specify the cal-
culus without this property and then prove it as a theorem, then
one should use GFOL without equality and dene equality as
an ordinary relation.
• Here and elsewhere, we state the typing conditions for equa-
tions as succinctly as possible; hence the above (β)-rule - its
hypothesis, typeOf ((λx : t.X)x, t′) is usually split in two:
typeOf (λx : t.X, t→ t′)∧typeOf (x, t). The latter are of course
equivalent with the former, via the [App]-rule. This succinct-
ness policy, with no spectacular results here, will become very
useful for more complicated calculi, such as Type:Type. More-
over, we think that the compact form gives the essence of the
hypothesis, which states nothing else but that the problematic
term of the equation, (λx : t.X)x, is well-typed.
• Another policy is to specify typing hypotheses for the equations
only if they are really needed, i.e., only if the equated terms are
susceptible of de-balancing typing. Thus in the case of (β),X
is surely well-typed whenever (λx : t.X)x is so, hence we only
require well-typed-ness of the latter; this way with minimal
precautions we avoid allowing equalities between a well-typed
term and a non-well-typed one. On the other hand in the ξ-rule,
provided (∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ X = Y ) holds, λx : t.X is well-
typed iff λx : t.Y is so, hence there is no need for any typing
hypotheses.
3.3 Typed λ-Calculus with Recursion (Tλµ)
• Extends Tλ
• DTerm ::= . . . | µDVar : TTerm.DTerm
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(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ typeOf (X, t))⇒
typeOf (µx : t.X, t) [µ]
typeOf (µx : t.X, t)⇒
µx : t.X = X[µx : t.X/x]
(µ)
3.4 System F (SF )
• Extends Tλ
• TTerm ::= . . . | Π TVar. TTerm
DTerm ::= . . . | DTerm TTerm | λ TVar.DTerm
(∀t.typeOf (X,T ))⇒
typeOf (λt.X,Πt. T ) [T-Abs]
typeOf (x,Πt. T )⇒
typeOf (x t, T ) [T-App]
(∀t.X = Y )⇒
λt.X = λt.Y
(Tξ)
typeOf (λt.X, t′)⇒
(λt.X)t = X
(Tβ)
typeOf (λt.x t, t′)⇒
x = λt.x t
(Tη)
3.5 Typed λ-Calculus with Recursion on Types (TλµT )
• Extends Tλ
• TTerm ::= . . . | µ TVar. TTerm
DTerm ::= . . . | intro〈TTerm〉DTerm | elim〈TTerm〉DTerm
typeOf (x, T [(µt.T )/t])⇒
typeOf (intro〈µt.T 〉x, µt.T ) [Intro]
typeOf (x, µt.T )⇒
typeOf (elim〈µt.T 〉x, T [(µt.T )/t]) [Elim]
elim〈µt.T 〉(intro〈µt.T 〉x) = x (Inverse1)
intro〈µt.T 〉(elim〈µt.T 〉x) = x (Inverse2)
3.6 Typed λ-Calculus with Type Operators and Binding (Tλω)
• Extends Tλ without [Abs] (this axiom needs to be modied)
• Adds a new sort, kind
• Var = (Varkind,Vartype,Vardata) = (KVar, TVar,DVar)
• Term = (Termkind, Termtype, Termdata) = (KTerm, TTerm,DTerm)
KTerm ::= ∗ | KVar | KTerm→ KTerm
TTerm ::= . . . | λ TVar : KTerm. TTerm
• New binary relation symbol, kindOf : type× kind
Here k, k′ range over kind variables.
(kindOf (t, ∗)∧
(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ typeOf (X, t′)))⇒
typeOf (λx : t.X, t→ t′)
[Abs]
kindOf (t, ∗) ∧ kindOf (t′, ∗)⇒
kindOf (t→ t′, ∗) [K-Arr]
(∀t.kindOf (t, k)⇒ kindOf (T, k′))⇒
kindOf (λt :k.T, k → k′) [K-Abs]
kindOf (t, k → k′) ∧ kindOf (t′, k)⇒
kindOf (t t′, k′) [K-App]
(∀t.kindOf (t, k)⇒ T = T ′)⇒
λt :k.T = λt :k.T ′ (Kξ)
kindOf ((λt :k.T )t, k′)⇒
(λt :k.T )t = T
(Kβ)
typeOf (λt :k.t′ t, k′)⇒
t′ = λt :k.t′ t (Kη)
3.7 Type:Type λ-Calculus (TTλ)
• Unsorted
• Term ::= Var | type | Term Term
λVar : Term.Term | ΠVar : Term
• One binary relation symbol, typeOf
Here x, t, t′, u range over variables, and X,T over terms. We
write x,X to refer what should be considered as data, t, t′, T when
types are meant, and u when the variable denotes either data or
types. (These conventions are taken only for readability.)
typeOf (type, type) [Type:Type]
typeOf (t, type)∧
(∀u.typeOf (u, t)⇒ typeOf (T, type))⇒
typeOf (Πu : t.T, type)
[Π]
typeOf (Πu : t.T, type)∧
(∀u.typeOf (u, t)⇒ typeOf (X,T ))⇒
typeOf (λu : t.X,Πu : t.T )
[Abs]
typeOf (Πu : t.T, type)∧
typeOf (x,Πu : t.T ) ∧ typeOf (u, t)⇒
typeOf (xu, T )
[App]
(∀u.typeOf (u, t)⇒ T = T ′)⇒
Πu : t.T = Πu : t.T ′ (ξΠ)
(∀u.typeOf (u, t)⇒ X = Y )⇒
λu : t.X = λu : t.Y
(ξλ)
typeOf ((λu : t.X)u, t′)⇒
(λu : t.X)u = X
(β)
typeOf (λu : t.x u, t′)⇒
x = λu : t.x u
(η)
3.8 A polymorphic calculus with units of measurement (TλU )
• Extends Tλ
• Adds a new sort, unit
• Var = (Varunit,Vartype,Vardata) = (UVar, TVar,DVar)
• Term = (Termunit, Termtype, Termdata) = (UTerm, TTerm,DTerm)
UTerm ::= . . . | UVar | 1 | UTerm · UTerm | UTerm−1
TTerm ::= . . . | QType UTerm | Π UVar. TTerm
DTerm ::= . . . | λUVar.DTerm | DTerm UTerm
Here u, u′, u′′ and U range over unit variables and unit terms.
(∀u.typeOf (X,T ))⇒
typeOf (λu.X,Πu.T ) [U-Abs]
typeOf (x,Πu.T )⇒
typeOf (xu, T ) [U-App]
u · u′ = u′ · u (Comm)
(u · u′) · u′′ = u · (u′ · u′′) (Assoc)
u · 1 = u (Id)
u · u−1 = 1 (Inv)
(∀u.X = Y )⇒
λu.X = λu.Y
(U-ξ)
typeOf ((λu.X)u, t′)⇒
(λu.X)u = X
(U-β)
typeOf (λu.x u, t′)⇒
x = λu.x u
(U-η)
Remarks:
• To make the calculus meaningful, one also needs to consider
basic units of measure, such as kg andm, as elements of UTerm.
• QType is a set of quantitative basic types, such as nat or real,
for which it makes sense to consider units of measurement.
Thus, for instance, realm2 is the type of surfaces, while the
type real should be seen as the polymorphic type ∀u.realu [11].
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3.9 ML-Style Polymorphic λ-calculus (MLλ)
• Extends Uλ; the imported sort is called data
• Adds two new sorts, type and typeScheme, with type < typeScheme
(thus we have an order-sorted setting)
• Var = (VartypeScheme,
Vartype,Vardata) = (TSVar, TVar,DVar), with TVar ⊆ TSVar
• Term = (TermtypeScheme, Termtype, Termdata) =
(TSTerm, TTerm,DTerm), where:
TSTerm ::= TSVar | TTerm | Π TVar. TSTerm
TTerm ::= TVar | TConst | TTerm→ TTerm
DTerm ::= . . . | let DVar = DTerm in DTerm
• Two binary relation symbols: typeOf : data × typeScheme and
moreGeneral : typeScheme× typeScheme.
Here x, y andX range over data variables and terms, t, t′ and T
over type variables and terms, and s, s′, s′′ and S over type scheme
variables and terms.
typeOf (x, s) ∧ moreGeneral(s′, s)⇒
typeOf (x, s′) [Inst]
(∀t.typeOf (x, S))⇒
typeOf (x,Πt.S) [Gen]
(∀x.typeOf (x, t)⇒ typeOf (X, t′))⇒
typeOf (λx.X, t→ t′) [Abs]
typeOf (y, s)∧
(∀x.typeOf (x, s)⇒ typeOf (X, s′))⇒
typeOf (let x = y in X, s′)
[Let]
typeOf (x, t→ t′) ∧ typeOf (y, t)⇒
typeOf (x y, t′) [App]
typeOf (let x = y in X, t)⇒
let x = y in X = X[y/x] (Let)
moreGeneral(Πt.S, S) (MG1)
moreGeneral(s, s′) ∧ moreGeneral(s′, s′′)⇒
moreGeneral(s, s′′) (MG2)
Remarks:
• The typing statement of the let construct, unlike that of λ-
abstraction, uses type scheme variables, hence allows for poly-
morphism;
• The relation of being more general is dened in a very simple
fashion; the rule (MG1) says that the type scheme Πt.S is
more general that S with any particular choice for the type
t appearing in S. Recall that the written formulae are meant
to express their universal closures, in particular are meant to
be universally quantied over t, hence any possible occurrence
of t in the second S of moreGeneral(Πt.S, S) is in the scope
of an outer universal quantier; this is precisely what any
particular choice means. (See also the previous discussion on
our β axiom.)
• The typing rule [Gen] says that if we can associate the type
(scheme) S to x for any type t, then we can regard the type S
of x as polymorphic in t.
4. GFOL Gentzen System and Completeness
Next we show that the axiomatic properties of the generic notions
of free variable and substitution in GFOL provide enough infras-
tructure for proving generic versions of classical FOL results. We
are interested in a completeness theorem here, but other model-
theoretic results could be generalized as well. We shall use the same
cut-free Gentzen system as the one usually given in the classical
setting [5]. It is worth mentioning that the system rather looks the
same than is the same to the classical one, since in the table below
T and [T/x] denote generic terms and substitution.
We x a generic rst-order language (Var, Term,Π). A sequent
is a pair written Γ . ∆, with Γ and ∆ sets of formulae. The sequent
Γ . ∆ is called tautological if for each model A,
T
ϕ∈Γ Aϕ ⊆S
ψ∈∆ Aψ , and falsiable if it is not tautological. A rule is a pair
H
S consisting of a sequent S and a (possibly empty) list of sequents
H . If H = · (i.e., it is the empty list) we call HS an axiom. We may
write S instead of ·S for axioms, thus identifying the axiom
·
S
with its sequent S. A Gentzen system is any set of rules. The notion
of a proof tree for a Gentzen system is dened the usual way - its
nodes are labelled with sequents, in a way that is consistent with
the rules: if a node is labelled with S, then its descendants, if they
exist, are labelled with the elements of H , where HS is a rule in
the Gentzen system. A completed proof tree is one which has all
its leaves labeled with axioms. A rule HS is sound if whenever all
sequents in H are tautological, S is tautological too. A sequent is
provable in a Gentzen system if it is the root of a completed proof
tree. A Gentzen system is sound, if all its provable sequents are
tautological, and complete if all tautological sequents are provable.
Note that soundness of a Gentzen system is equivalent to soundness
of each of its rules.
We consider the Gentzen system (that we denote G), famous
for the classical FOL setting, given by the following rule schemes
(below we write, e.g., Γϕ instead of Γ ∪ {ϕ}):
Left Right
Γ . ∆ ϕ
Γ¬ϕ . ∆
Γ ϕ . ∆
Γ . ∆ ¬ϕ (¬)
Γ ϕ ψ . ∆
Γ ϕ ∧ ψ . ∆
Γ . ∆ ϕ , Γ . ∆ ψ
Γ . ∆ ϕ ∧ ψ (∧)
Γ . ∆ ϕ , Γ ψ . ∆
Γ ϕ⇒ ψ . ∆
Γϕ . ∆ ψ
Γ . ∆ ϕ⇒ ψ (⇒)
Γ ∀x.ϕ ϕ[T/x] . ∆
Γ ∀x.ϕ . ∆
Γ . ∆ ϕ[y/x]
Γ . ∆ ∀x.ϕ
y not free in
Γ,∆, ∀x.ϕ (∀)
·
Γ . ∆ if Γ ∩∆ 6= ∅ (Ax)
THEOREM 1. The Gentzen system G is sound and complete for
generic rst-order logic.
Proof: Soundness: We need to check that the rules are sound. We
only consider the quantier rules, since the soundness of the others
follows standardly. Let A be a model. For soundness of (∀Left),
it sufces that A∀x.ϕ ⊆ Aϕ[T/x], which is true because of the
following: ρ ∈ A∀x.ϕ is equivalent to ρ[x ← a] ∈ Aϕ for all
a ∈ A, which implies ρ[x ← AT (ρ)] ∈ Aϕ, which in turn is
equivalent, by Proposition 2.(2), to ρ ∈ Aϕ[T/x].
For (∀Right), we shall tacitly use Proposition 2.(1,2) several
times. Assume
T
χ∈Γ Aχ ⊆
S
ψ∈∆ Aψ ∪ Aϕ[y/x], where y is not
free in Γ,∆, ∀x.ϕ. We need to show Tχ∈Γ Aχ ⊆ Sψ∈∆ Aψ ∪
A∀x.ϕ. For this, let ρ ∈
T
χ∈Γ Aχ such that ρ 6∈
S
ψ∈∆ Aψ , and
let us show that ρ ∈ A∀x.ϕ, i.e., that ρ[x ← a] ∈ Aϕ for all
a ∈ A. Let a ∈ A. Because ρ[y ← a]FV(χ)= ρFV(χ) for each
χ ∈ Γ ∪ ∆ (since y 6∈ FV(χ)), we have ρ[y ← a] ∈ Tχ∈Γ Aχ
and ρ[y ← a] 6∈ Sψ∈∆ Aψ . Thus ρ[y ← a] ∈ Aϕ[y/x], i.e.,
ρ[y ← a][x ← Aρ[y←a](y)] ∈ Aϕ, i.e., ρ[y ← a][x ← a] ∈ Aϕ.
If y = x, we get ρ[x ← a] ∈ Aϕ, as desired. On the other hand
if y 6= x, then ρ[y ← a][x ← a] = ρ[x ← a][y ← a], hence
9 2006/5/3
ρ[x ← a][y ← a] ∈ Aϕ; and since ρ[x← a][y ← a] FV(ϕ)=
ρ[x← a]FV(ϕ), we get ρ[x← a] ∈ Aϕ, again as desired.
Completeness: The proof mainly follows a classical line (see
[5]). Its only slightly specic part will be the one of constructing a
model from a Hintikka signed set (sets Hleft and Hright below).
Assume that Γ . ∆ is a tautological sequent. Call a sequent
hopeless if it is not an axiom and no rule can be applied backwards
to it.4 Note that a hopeless sequent Γ′ . ∆′ is one such that Γ′ ∩
∆′ = ∅ and Γ′,∆′ consist of atomic formulae; such a sequent is
falsiable, as shown below: let ρ be the identity valuation 1Var in
a Herbrand model that denes its relations as to make all formulae
in Γ′ true and all formulae in ∆′ false; this is possible precisely
because Γ′ and ∆′ are disjoint sets of atomic formulae.
As in [5], we construct backwards from Γ . ∆ a possibly in-
nite proof tree, roughly by expanding the nodes not labelled with
axioms or hopeless sequents via a fair application of rules to se-
quents. Special care needs to be taken when considering the (∀Left)
rule, since when the turn of this rule comes according to the con-
sidered fair scheduler, a counter n associated to the correspond-
ing formula in Γ needs to be increased, and the rule needs to be
applied for each of the rst n terms (w.r.t., say, the lexicographic
order). Moreover, dovetailing needs to be applied to the elements
of Γ and ∆, provided these sets are innite: x an order on the
set, and rst consider the rst element, then the rst two elements
etc. The (rather tedious) details are provided in [5] - the important
thing is that these details are all independent of the concrete syntax
of terms.
If the obtained tree is nite and all its leaves are labelled with
axioms, the tree is completed, hence we have a proof for Γ . ∆, as
desired. If the tree is nite and there is a hopeless leaf falsiable
by some valuation ρ in a model M , then by the way rules in G
were dened (to hold in an iff form), it follows that Γ . ∆ itself
is falsiable by ρ in M . It remains to consider the case of an
innite tree. If we prove that Γ . ∆ is falsiable, then we are done.
Consider the labels Γi . ∆i of an arbitrarily chosen innite path in
the tree, with Γ0 = Γ and ∆0 = ∆; by the construction of the tree,
these labels do not include any axiom. If we set Hleft =
S
i∈IN Γi
and Hright =
S
i∈IN ∆i, we get the following properties by the fair
way in which rules were applied backwards in the construction of
the tree:
• ¬ϕ ∈ Hleft implies ϕ ∈ Hright;
• ¬ϕ ∈ Hright implies ϕ ∈ Hleft;
• ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Hleft implies ϕ ∈ Hleft and ψ ∈ Hleft;
• ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Hright implies ϕ ∈ Hright or ψ ∈ Hright;
• ϕ⇒ ψ ∈ Hleft implies ϕ ∈ Hright or ψ ∈ Hleft;
• ϕ⇒ ψ ∈ Hright implies ϕ ∈ Hleft and ψ ∈ Hright;
• ∀x.ϕ ∈ Hleft implies for all T ∈ Term, ϕ[T/x] ∈ Hleft;
• ∀x.ϕ ∈ Hright implies there exists y ∈ Var with ϕ[y/x] ∈
Hright (in particular, there exists T ∈ Term with ϕ[T/x] ∈
Hright).
Moreover, because the considered innite path does not contain
(nodes labelled with) axioms and because both the Γi's and the
∆i's are totally ordered by inclusion w.r.t. their atomic formulae, it
holds that Hleft ∩Hright ∩ Atomic Formulae = ∅.
In order to falsify Γ . ∆, it sufces to falsify Hleft . Hright.
We dene a Herbrand model A by letting (T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Api iff
4 The proof trees are assumed to grow by backwards application of the rules,
in the sense that a leaf is matched against a conclusion of the rule, and then
the hypotheses of the rule are added to the tree.
pi(T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Hleft, and take the valuation ρ : Var → A to
be again 1Var. We prove by structural induction on ϕ the following
statement: [ϕ ∈ Hleft implies A |=ρ ϕ] and [ϕ ∈ Hright implies
A 6|=ρ ϕ]. If ϕ has the form pi(T1, . . . , Tn), then by the denition
of A, A |=ρ pi(T1, . . . , Tn) iff pi(T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Hleft. In partic-
ular, pi(T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Hleft implies A |=ρ pi(T1, . . . , Tn). More-
over, since pi(T1, . . . , Tn) is atomic and because ofHleft∩Hright∩
Atomic Formulae = ∅, it cannot happen that pi(T1, . . . , Tn) ∈
Hright and A |=ρ pi(T1, . . . , Tn), thus pi(T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Hright
implies A 6|=ρ pi(T1, . . . , Tn). The case of the logical connec-
tives is straightforward. Assume now ϕ has the form ∀x.ψ. From
∀x.ψ ∈ Hleft we infer that ψ[T/x] ∈ H left for each term T (i.e.,
for each element T of A), and furthermore, by the induction hy-
potheses, that A |=ρ ψ[T/x], i.e., ρ ∈ Aψ[T/x], i.e., by Proposi-
tion 2.(2), ρ[x ← Aρ(T )] ∈ Aψ , i.e., ρ[x ← T ] ∈ Aϕ, for each
T ∈ A; thusA |=ρ ∀x.ψ. That ∀x.ψ ∈ Hright impliesA 6|=ρ ∀x.ψ
can be proved similarly.
Thus Γ . ∆ is falsiable and the proof is nished. 
To obtain a complete Gentzen system for GFOL=, we add to G
the following equality rules:
Γ . ∆T = T
Γ . ∆ (Re)
Γ . ∆T1 = T2 , ΓT2 = T1 . ∆
Γ . ∆ (Symm)
Γ . ∆T1 = T2 , Γ . ∆T2 = T3 ,
ΓT1 = T3 . ∆
Γ . ∆ (Trans)
Γ . ∆T1 = T
′
1 , . . . , Γ . ∆Tn = T
′
n ,
Γ . ∆pi(T1, . . . , Tn) , Γpi(T
′
1, . . . , T
′
n) . ∆
Γ . ∆ (Comppi)
Γ . ∆T1 = T2 , Γ T [T1/x] = T [T2/x] . ∆
Γ . ∆ (Subs)
The above are the usual axioms for equality, and make sense for
our generic framework. In concrete cases, congruence w.r.t. various
kinds of operations will be captured as a particular case of (Subs).
We let G= denote this enriched Gentzen system.
THEOREM 2. The Gentzen system G= is sound and complete for
generic rst-order languages with equality.
Proof: Soundness: We only check soundness of the rule regarding
substitution. Let A and ρ such that AT1(ρ) = AT2(ρ) for each
i ∈ {1, n}. Then by point (c).(ii) in the denition of models,
AT [T ′/x](ρ) = AT (ρ[x ← AT ′(ρ)]) = AT (ρ[x ← AT1(ρ)]) =
AT [T2/x](ρ).
Completeness: One can see that the effect of adding the axioms
for equality amounts to adding a xed countable set Eql of univer-
sally quantied sentences (containing, among others, all sentences
of the form T1 = T2 ⇒ T [T1/x] = T [T2/x] universally quan-
tied over their free variables) to Γ, and then using the system G,
whenever one needs to prove Γ . ∆. Thus Γ . ∆ is provable in G=
iff Γ′ ∪ Γ . ∆ is provable in G.
Now, given any model A in the language without equality (i.e.,
in the language that contains =, but treats this symbol as just an
ordinary binary relation symbol) that satises Eql, one denes the
relation≡ by a ≡ b iffA |=ρ x = y for some ρ with ρ(x) = a and
ρ(y) = b. Due to satisfaction of Eql by A, ≡ is an equivalence
compatible with the relations Api and with the substitution, the
latter in the sense that whenever AT1(ρ) = AT2(ρ), it holds that
AT [T1/x](ρ) = AT [T2/x](ρ). Thus we can speak about a quotient
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model A/≡ and dene, for each ρ : Var → A, ρ′ : Var → A/≡
by ρ′(x) = ρ(x)/≡. Then a simple induction on ϕ shows that
A/≡ |=ρ′ ϕ iff A |=ρ ϕ. It follows that Γ . ∆ is tautological
in the logic with equality iff Γ′ ∪ Γ . ∆ is tautological in the logic
without equality.
Completeness of G= now follows from completeness of G. 
We let `GFOL and `=GFOL denote the consequence relations5 in
GFOL and GFOL with equality, respectively.
5. The Horn2 Fragment of GFOL
We next consider a fragment of GFOL, called Horn2 because it
only allows formulae which are universally quantied implications
whose conditions are themselves universally quantied implica-
tions of atomic formulae. All our GFOL specications of calculi
with bindings from Section 3 consist of Horn2 formulae. As shown
in the sequel, we can associate to these theories more natural and in-
tuitive proof systems, which resemble almost identically (modulo
syntactic sugar modications and some built-in type preservation
properties) the corresponding original proof systems of the calculi.
For convenience, we assume that the language also contains
the logical constant >, and that the Gentzen system G also con-
tains an axiom ·> . Obviously, G is still sound and complete.
We take the convention that > is an (always true) atomic for-
mula. For simplifying notation, in what follows we write x to
denote a tuple (x1, . . . , xn) of variables, and for a formula ϕ,
ϕ(x) to indicate the fact that ϕ has all its free variables among
{x1, . . . , xn}. Once a formula has been written as ϕ(x), ϕ(T ) de-
notes ϕ[T1/x1, . . . , Tn/xn], where T is assumed to be an n-uple
of terms (T1, . . . , Tn). We caution the reader that, because vari-
ables are particular kinds of terms, we shall use the notation ϕ(y)
with two different meanings, depending on the context: either to in-
dicate that ϕ has its variables among {y1, . . . , yn}, case in which
ϕ(y) is the same as ϕ, or to denote the formula obtained from ϕ
by substituting the variables x (assumed indicated previously by
writing ϕ as ϕ(x)) with the variables y. a, b, c, d will range over
atomic formulae.
We consider the fragment of GFOL consisting of formulae of
the form:
∀y.
 
∀x.
n^
i=1
(ai(x, y)⇒ bi(x, y))
!
⇒ c(y) (∗)
where ai, bi, c are atomic formulae. We call these type of formulae
Horn2-formulae. When ai is > we write only bi(x, y) instead of
ai(x, y) ⇒ bi(x, y), and when all bi's are >, or when n = 0, we
write c(y) instead of (∗).
We shall only care about universally quantied atomic sen-
tences as consequences of specications built of Horn2 formulae.
We do this for two reasons:
- in concrete examples, all other formulae can be deduced from
these using (some forms of) the Constant Lemma and the Deduc-
tion Theorem.
- only these type of consequences are usually relevant for the se-
mantics of programming languages.
Our goal next is to simplify the Gentzen system G as much as
possible for this particular fragment of generic rst-order logic.
We rst provide some immediate simplications, based on the
following remarks:
5 The semantic and syntactic consequence relations coincide by complete-
ness.
1. There is no need for the rules involving negation, because
any provable negation-free sequent has a completed proof tree
whose sequents do not contain negation;
2. There is no change in provability if we accept as axioms only
those rules ·Γ . ∆ such that there exists an atomic sentence in
Γ ∩ ∆; this is because whenever a sequent Γ . ∆ is such that
there is a compound formula ϕ in Γ ∩ ∆, then there is a non-
axiom rule which can be applied backwards to it such that all its
(one or two) upper sequents Γ′ . ∆′ have a strict subformula of
ϕ in Γ′ ∩∆′.
Let us x a set E of Horn2 formulae. We obtain the following
simpler system, G′, for entailing sequents of the form Γ . ∆, where
Γ and ∆ are nite sets of atomic formulae which are consequences
of (the universal closures of) the formulae in E.
·
Γ . ∆ if Γ ∩∆ 6= ∅ (Axiom)
Γai(z, T ) . ∆bi(z, T ) for i = 1, n, Γc(T ) . ∆
Γ . ∆ (SubsMP)
In the rule (SubsMP) above, ai, bi, c come from a sentence inE of
the form (∗), z is a fresh tuple of variables with the same length as
x, and T is a tuple of terms with the same length as y. Here as well
as in the other similar rules that we shall consider, we implicitly
assume that if ai is>, then we do not add it to Γ, and if bi is>, we
do not add the sequence Γai(z, T ) . ∆bi(z, T ) at the hypothesis.
Moreover, notice that if n = 0, the rule has only one hypothesis,
Γc(T ) . ∆.
According to the above discussion, we get the following:
PROPOSITION 3. The Gentzen system G′ is complete for deducing
sequents Γ . ∆, where Γ and ∆ are nite sets of atomic formulae.
The system G′ still has the unpleasant property that the goals in
the right-hand side of sequents need to be preserved all throughout
deduction. By contrast, for instance equational deduction would not
need, in a rule analogous to SubsMP, to keep ∆ near bi(z, T ). The
question arises whether this also can be done in our more general
framework,6 i.e., if ∆ can be dropped as a helping goal; in other
words, whether SubsMP can be replaced with:
Γai(z, T ) . bi(z, T ) for i = 1, n,
Γc(T ) . ∆
Γ . ∆ (SimpleSubsMP)
where ai, bi, c, z and T have the same meaning as at (SubsMP).
We shall show that indeed this can be done, in certain cases. But
rst notice that usually such a simplication is not possible, as
shown by the following example from rst-order (propositional)
logic: E is {(a ⇒ b) ⇒ c, b ⇒ c}. Then c is a semantic conse-
quence of E, and thus ∅ . c should be provable; however, this se-
quent is not provable by means of (Axiom) and (Simple-SubsMP),
as the reader can easily check. One may think that the presence
of non-trivial universal quantication over some variable x in the
left-hand side (i.e., on top of a⇒ b, assumed to be sentences con-
taining x) could prevent such counterexamples, but the problem is
more subtle; for instance, take E to be {(∀x.a(x) ⇒ b(x)) ⇒
6 Our framework is more general than that of Horn- or equational -like
logics in two aspects: w.r.t. the notion of term, and w.r.t. the type of the
considered formulae.
11 2006/5/3
c, (∀x.b(x)) ⇒ c}. Then again c is a semantic consequence of E,
but the sequent ∅ . c is not provable by means of of (Axiom) and
(Simple-SubsMP).
From now on, until otherwise stated, our discussion will con-
cern the Gentzen system G′. In order to introduce a criterion for
the soundness of the above simplication, we need to some further
denitions.
Given an instance of the (SubsMP) rule of above indicated
form, its essential instance is by denition the triple
((ai(z, T ))i∈{1,...,n}, (bi(z, T ))i∈{1,...,n}, c(T )). Note that each
non-leaf node in a proof tree has an associated essential instance.
We shall abbreviate completed proof tree by CPT. In what
follows, when talking about CPT's, minimal (smaller) means
minimal (smaller) w.r.t. its number of essential instances, where
the number of essential instances is considered to be the cardinal
of the set of essential instances, thus not counting the repetitions.
We say that a CPT uses a set of sentences Θ if it has a leaf labelled
Γ . ∆ such that Γ ∩∆ ⊆ Θ. We say that it uses a sentence ϕ if it
uses {ϕ}. Given a sequent Γ . ∆ and and a sentence d ∈ Γ, we say
that d is useless for Γ . ∆ if there exists a minimal CPT for Γ . ∆
that does not use d.
We now consider the following property of E, that we call, for
need of a better name, Amenability:
For each instance of (SubsMP) of above indicated form and
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with ai different from> and z non-empty, ai(z, T )
is useless (in G′) for Γ ∪ {ai(z, T )} . ∆.
Notice that Amenability holds trivially for any kind of Horn or
conditional-equational logic (even if it involves bindings in terms,
so these include the untyped λ-calculus), since for these cases each
time either n = 0 or ai above is >, and thus there is nothing to
check. Thus for the reader interested in proof theory, the below
discussion in particular shows how completeness of the simple
Gentzen system for equational logic follows from the completeness
of the signicantly more involved one of FOL. Moreover, instances
of the induction axiom scheme for the natural numbers, so long
as the property P (x, z) to be proved by induction on x is atomic
(such as associativity, commutativity etc.), fall into this category,
because they can be expressed as: ∀x, z.(P (0, z) ∧ ∀y.P (y, z)⇒
P (y + 1, z))⇒ P (x, z).
For what follows, we assume E amenable. Our next goal is to
prove that (SubsMP) can be replaced with (Simple-SubsMP).
It will be convenient to work with non-redundant trees. A CPT is
non-redundant is it has no node with the property that it is labelled
identically to one of its sons. Non-redundant CPT's (henceforth
abbreviated NRCPT) have the following nice properties:
(1) Subtrees of NRCPT's are NRCPT's;
(2) An NRCPT has strictly more essential instances than any of its
strict subtrees - this follows from the fact that, for any completed
proof tree, it is redundant to apply again somewhere in the tree the
essential instance applied at the root;
((3) Any CPT can be transformed into an equivalent NRCPT with
the same essential instances - the transformation simply deletes the
redundancies.
LEMMA 1. Let T be a minimal NRCPT and assume that it is non-
trivial, i.e., it has an application of (SubsMP) at its root of the
form given above. Let (Ti)i=1,n and T ′ be, from left to right, the
sub-trees of T generated by this application. Then the NRCPT's Ti
do not use ∆.
Proof: By induction on the number m of essential instances of T .
If m = 0, then we have a contradiction with the minimality of T
via the hypotheses.
Assume m > 0. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}; we want to show that Ti
does not use ∆. If, by absurd, it did, then consider the path in Ti
from its root labelled Γai(z, T ) . ∆bi(z, T ), to the rightmost leaf,
which is labelled with an axiom Γai(z, T )c1 . . . ck . ∆bi(z, T ).
Because of the induction hypotheses, all its subtrees that do not
contain this path do not use ∆ ∪ {bi(z, T )}, in particular, do
not use ∆. Thus the only possibility for Ti to use ∆ is that
(Γ ∪ {ai(z, T ), c1, . . . , ck}) ∩ (∆ ∪ {bi(z, T )}) ⊆ ∆. But this
means that either bi(z, T ) ∈ ∆, or this rightmost path does not use
bi(z, T ), and thus Ti does not use bi(z, T ). In the former case, Ti
is actually a NRCPT for Γai(z, T ) . ∆; in the latter, by deleting
bi(z, T ) everywhere in Ti, we obtain a NRCPT for Γai(z, T ) . ∆.
Either way, we have a NRCPT T ′ for Γai(z, T ) . ∆ strictly
smaller than T . By Amenability, we can assume that T ′ does not
use ai(z, T ), hence it yields a NRCPT for Γ . ∆, strictly smaller
than T , which is contradictory. 
According to Lemma 1, we can replace the rule scheme (Sub-
sMP) with (Simple-SubsMP). Furthermore, if we restrict our in-
terest to sequents Γ . ∆ with ∆ containing a single formula, we
can replace (Simple-SubsMP) with two rule schemes:
Γai(z, T ) . bi(z, T ) for i = 1, n,
Γ . c(T )
(Simplisim-SubsMP)
Γ . c , Γc . d
Γ . d
(Cut)
and the rule (Axiom) with:
·
Γ . d
if d ∈ Γ (Simple-Axiom)
That these new rules can simulate the old ones (for sequents Γ . d
with d a single formula) is immediate. Moreover, by the complete-
ness of the old rules, the new rules cannot bring more power than
(Simple-SubsMP).
Finally, we can eliminate the (Cut) rule:
LEMMA 2. The rule schemes (Simplisim-SubsMP) and (Simple-
Axiom) are as powerful as (Simplisim-SubsMP), (Cut) and
(Simple-Axiom).
Proof: Below we use minimal with a similar meaning as before,
just that now it is w.r.t. essential instances of the rules (Simplisim-
SubsMP) and (Cut), where the notion of essential instance is
similar. We show that for each minimal NRCPT of Γ . d hav-
ing an application of the (Cut) rule only once, at the root, there
exists a minimal NRCPT for Γ . d that does not this rule at all.
Assume such a NRCPT T starting with an application of (Cut)
of the form indicated above. If Γc . d is an axiom, then either
d ∈ Γ contradicting the minimality of T , or c is equal to d, con-
tradicting the non-redundancy of T . So assume Γc . d is derived
from Γ c ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T ), with d being c(T ). We obtain a NR-
CPT T ′ for Γ . d, as small as T , by switching the applications
of (Cut) and (Simplisim-SubsMP). More precisely, we derive
Γ . d from Γ ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T ), and each Γ ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T )
from Γai(z, T ) . c and Γ c ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T ), where the proof
of Γai(z, T ) . c is copied from the one of Γ . c. Applying the in-
duction hypothesis for the NRCPT's (strictly smaller than T ) of
Γ c ai(z, T ) . bi(z, T ), we can assume that they do not use (Cut),
and we are done. 
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We thus obtain a system close to the Hilbert system of the Horn
or equational logics, in the smart version used by the rewriting
engines, i.e., with substitutions applied only to the xed set of
axioms in the specication, and not to any derived formula. Let
K denote this Gentzen, system consisting of the rule schemes
(Simplisim-SubsMP) and (Simple-Axiom). We can now state the
main result of in this section:
THEOREM 3. If E is amenable, then the system K is complete for
deducing consequences of E of the form Γ . d, where Γ is a nite
set of atomic sentences and d is an atomic sentence.
The case of Horn2-formulae in GFOL with equality can be
treated using the observation that the equality axioms Eql are
Horn2-formulae themselves. In GFOL with equality, we call a the-
ory E amenable if E ∪ Eql is amenable in GFOL without equal-
ity. Thus a result similar to Theorem 3 holds for languages with
equality too. The corresponding Gentzen system, denoted K=, is
obtained from K by adding the equality axioms.
THEOREM 4. If E is amenable in GFOL with equality, the system
K= is complete for deducing consequences of E of the form Γ . d,
where Γ is a nite set of atomic sentences and d is an atomic
sentence.
Next we give a sufcient, more effective, criterion for Amenabil-
ity. For an atomic formula a, let head(a) denote the relation sym-
bol used in a. A position of a relation symbol pi ∈ Πn is a number
in {1, . . . , n}. We say that a variable x occurs in an atomic formula
a of the form pi(t1, . . . , tn) on position p of pi if x ∈ FV(tp).
A position p ∈ {1, . . . , n} is said to be persistent for pi ∈ Πn
(w.r.t. E) if for each sentence in E of the form (∗), the following
property holds: for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that head(bi) = pi
and no variable of x is in FV (bi), there exists a position q ∈
{1, . . . , rank(head(c))}, persistent for head(c), such that all vari-
ables occurring in bi on position p of pi occur also in c on position q
of head(c). Note that the above is a coinductive denition, which
can be rigorously stated in terms of a two-player (innite) game,
with the pair (p, pi) as its initial state: Player 1 picks a formula ϕ
in E and an i such that head(bi) = pi and no variable of x is in
FV (bi), and the game gets into the state (p, ϕ). (Assume ϕ has
the form (*).) Then Player 2 picks q ∈ {1, . . . , rank(head(c))}
such that all variables occurring in bi on position p of pi occur also
in c on position q of head(c), and the game gets into the state
(q, head(c)). And so on. (Thus the states of the game are either
pairs (position, relational symbol) or pairs (position, formula in
E).) If a player gets stuck, then the other wins the game; if the
game continues indenitely, then Player 2 wins. By denition, p
is persistent for pi iff Player 2 has a winning strategy. Intuitively,
persistency of a position means that any variable occurring on that
position will not disappear during application of the Horn2 for-
mulae of E.
We consider the following possible property of E, that we call
Freshness:
For every sentence in E of the form (∗) and every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
with ai different from >, there exists at least one variable in x
that occurs in ai on a position of head(ai), which is persistent
for head(ai).
Notice that the freshnes hypothesis holds trivially for any kind
of Horn or conditional-equational logic, since for these cases each
time either n = 0 or ai above is >, and thus there is nothing to
check. Thus for the reader interested in proof theory, the below
discussion in particular shows how completeness of the simple
Gentzen system for equational logic follows from the completeness
of the signicantly more involved one of FOL. Moreover, instances
of the induction axiom scheme for the natural numbers, so long
as the property P (x, z) to be proved by induction on x is atomic
(such as associativity, commutativity etc.), fall into this category,
because they can be expressed as: ∀x, z.(P (0, z) ∧ ∀y.P (y, z)⇒
P (y + 1, z))⇒ P (x, z).
LEMMA 3. For each NRCPT of Γ . ∆ with Γ∩∆ = ∅ and d ∈ Γ,
that uses d, there exists a NRCPT, having the same set of essential
instances, that has on its second level from the root a label Γ′ . ∆′
with d ∈ Γ′ ∩∆′.
Proof: Let T denote the original NRCPT. Since it uses d and
d 6∈ ∆, the only possibility is that d appeared in the right-hand side
of a sequent as part of an essential instance, being equal to some
bi(z, t). We can modify T into a CPT T ′ by applying rstly (i.e., at
the root) the rule given by this essential instance, and then acting as
before on the resulted goals. This change might increase the depth
of the tree and its number of leaves (because some branches in T
might not take advantage of this eagerly applied essential instance
at all), but not its set of essential instances. Indeed, T ′ rstly applies
the mentioned essential instance, which was anyway used also in T
at some point, and then T ′ applies only what T applied. Now we
can transform T ′ into an NRCPT according to point (3) above. 
LEMMA 4. Assume that d ∈ Γ has a free variable u occurring in
d on a persistent position p for head(d), and not occurring in ∆.
Then any minimal NRCPT for Γ . ∆ does not use d.
Proof: By induction on the number n of essential instances of a
minimal NRCPT T for Γ . ∆. If n = 0, then Γ . ∆ is an axiom,
and since d 6∈ ∆, it follows that Γ \ {d} . ∆ is also an axiom,
hence T does not use d.
Assume n > 0 and assume, by absurdity, that T uses d. By
the minimality of T , Γ ∩ ∆ = ∅, and by Lemma 3, we can
assume that T applies at its root an instance of (SubsMP) such
that one of the resulting goals is an axiom having d on both sides.
Thus d is equal to bi(z, t) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Because z is
fresh, no variable in z is in FV (d), hence FV (bi) cannot contain
any variable from x; therefore we write bi(y) and bi(t) instead of
bi(x, y) and bi(z, t). Moreover, by the persistency of the position p
for head(bi), the variable u occurs in c on a persistent position for
head(c). (To see that this indeed follows from condition-linearity,
notice that u is in some FV (tk) with k ∈ {1, . . . , l} where
t = (t1, . . . , tl) and yk occurs on position p in bi(y); it follows that
yk occurs in c(y) on a persistent position q for head(c), implying
that u also occurs in c(t) on this persistent position q.) Now, the
subtree T ′ given by Γc(t) . ∆ has strictly less essential instances
than T , hence, by the induction hypothesis, T ′ does not use c(t).
Consequently, so we can delete in T ′ every occurrence of c(t),
obtaining an NRCPT for Γ . ∆ strictly smaller than T , which is
contradictory. 
COROLLARY 1. Freshness is a sufcient criterion for Amenability.
Proof: Follows from Lemma 4. 
6. Semantic Instances of GFOL
In this paper we do not consider the (admittedly important) rewriting-
based operational aspect of lambda-calculi. Thus we identify cal-
culi with their deductive systems, meant to entail both typing judge-
ments and equations. From this perspective, a calculus becomes a
logic when it is assigned a semantics. The built-in semantics of
our GFOL theories can be classied as set-theoretical. We claim
that this built-in semantics (that comes for free, together with the
GFOL specication) conforms quite well specic set-theoretical
semantics of calculi previously proposed in the literature. We ex-
emplify this on untyped λ-calculus and on System F. For the for-
mer, the GFOL semantics coincides (up to a carrier-preserving
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bijection between classes of models) with the specic semantics,
and for the latter GFOL provides a novel semantics, which we
shall prove equivalent to the set-theoretical one given in [3]. Our
notion of equivalence of semantics is the model-theoretical, ask-
ing that there exists a bijection between elementary equivalence
classes of models, and will be ensured by the existence of back and
forth satisfaction- preserving and reecting mappings between the
classes of models.
These two well-known calculi (λ-calculus and System F) were
our chosen case studies. However we conjecture that regardless
of their presumptive existing semantics, all the calculi in Section
3 receive (alternative) complete semantics via the completeness
theorem of GFOL. This thesis of course needs separate proofs
for each case, but we consider that the semantic clarity of our
specications plead for its truth. Classical rst-order logic and a
new logic called formula-typed logic are also semantic instances
of GFOL.
6.1 First-order logic
Let (Var,Σ,Π) be a rst-order language (possibly with equal-
ity), where Var is a countably innite set of variables, and Σ =
(Σn)n∈IN and Π = (Πn)n∈IN are ranked sets of operation and
relation symbols. We take Term to be the term syntax consisting
of ordinary rst-order terms over Σ and Var, and dene a generic
rst-order language (with or without equality) as (Var, Term,Π). A
classical rst-order model (A, (Aσ)σ∈Σ, (Api)pi∈Π) immediately
yields a GFOL model (A, (AT )T∈Term, (Api)pi∈Π) by dening
the meaning of terms as derived operations. Conversely, given a
GFOL model (A, (AT )T∈Term, (Api)pi∈Π), one can extract a clas-
sical model by dening Aσ : An → A as Aσ(a1, . . . , an) =
Aσ(x1,...,xn)(ρ), where x1, . . . , xn are distinct variables and ρ
is a valuation that maps each xi to ai. (Note that the denition of
Aσ does not depend on the choice of the xi's.) The following is
very easy to prove:
PROPOSITION 4. The mappings above between classical FOL
models of (Var,Σ,Π) and GFOL models of (Var, Term,Π) are
mutually inverse and preserve satisfaction. Thus we have an iso-
morphism of logics between classical rst-order logic (with or
without equality) and the corresponding instance of GFOL.
6.2 Untyped λ-Calculus
We let Λ denote the set of λ-terms over a countably innite set
Var of variables, modulo α-equivalence (see [2] for details; we
use the same notations as there). In order to ease the presentation,
we do not consider constants, but they could have been consid-
ered as well without any further difculties. Substitution and free
variables are dened as usual. We recall from [2] some model-
theoretic notions of λ-calculus. Let us call pre-structure a triple
(A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ(A)), where A is a set, 〈 〉 is a binary opera-
tion on A (i.e., (A, 〈 〉) is an applicative structure), and for each
T ∈ Λ(A), AT : AVar → A, where Λ(A) denotes the set of λ-
terms with constants in A, modulo α-equivalence.
Given an equation T1 = T2 with T1, T2 lambda-terms, one
denes A |=λ T1 = T2 by AT1(ρ) = AT2(ρ) for all ρ : Var→ A.
For pre-structures, we consider the following properties (where a, b
range over elements of A, x over variables, T, T1, T2 over terms,
ρ, ρ′ over valuations, i.e., elements of AVar):
(P1) Ax(ρ) = ρ(x);
(P2) AT1T2(ρ) = AT1(ρ)〈AT2(ρ)〉;
(P3) If ρFV(T )= ρ′FV(T ), then AT (ρ) = AT (ρ′);
(P4) If AT (ρ[x← a]) = AT ′(ρ[x← a]) for all a ∈ A, then
Aλx.T (ρ) = Aλx.T ′(ρ);
(P5) Aλx.T (ρ)〈a〉 = AT (ρ[x← a]);
(P6) If a〈c〉 = b〈c〉 for all c ∈ A, then a = b;
(P7) Aa(ρ) = a.
We next simplify the pre-structures slightly, by removing their
redundant data given by parameterized terms. A simple pre-
structure is a triple (A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ) which satises all prop-
erties of a pre-structure, except (P7). Note that the difference be-
tween simple pre-structures and pre-structures is that only terms in
Λ, and not in Λ(A), are considered. Hence the notion of satisfac-
tion, dened for pre-structures only w.r.t. equations involving terms
in Λ, also makes sense for simple pre-structures. We shall only be
interested in pre-structures verifying at least (P1)-(P4). In this case,
simple pre-structures and pre-structures are essentially identical:
LEMMA 5. The forgetful function mapping (A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ(A))
to (A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ) is a bijection, preserving satisfaction and
each of the properties (P5),(P6), between pre-structures verifying
(P1)-(P4) and (P7) and simple pre-structures verifying (P1)-(P4).
Proof: The inverse of the forgetful function maps simple pre-
structures (A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ) verifying (P1)-(P4) to (A, 〈 〉,
(AT )T∈Λ(A)), where for each term T in Λ, sequence of elements
a1, . . . , an in A and sequence of distinct variables x1, . . . , xn,
AT [a1/x1,...,an/xn](ρ) is, by denition,AT (ρ[x1 ← a1, . . . , xn ←
an]). This denition is correct, because any term in Λ(A) has
the form T [a1/x1, . . . , an/xn] for some T , and AT (ρ[x1 ←
a1, . . . , xn ← an]) does not depend on the choice of T . A
simple induction on the structure of Λ(A) terms shows that
AT [a1/x1,...,an/xn](ρ) is indeed equal toAT (ρ[x1 ← a1, . . . , xn ←
an]) in any pre-structure, and thus the two mappings are mutually
inverse.
These mappings preserve satisfaction, since satisfaction is basi-
cally the same in each two structures related by these mappings -
note also that in pre-structures only satisfaction of Λ-term equali-
ties is dened. As for properties (P5) and (P6), one needs another
induction to prove that in a pre-structure, verifying these properties
w.r.t. Λ-terms is sufcient for them to hold w.r.t. Λ(A)-terms; here
one uses again the equality AT [a1/x1,...,an/xn](ρ) = AT (ρ[x1 ←
a1, . . . , xn ← an]). 
This lemma allows us to work with the more amenable simple pre-
structures, which we henceforth call pre-structures, and forget
about the more complicated ones, as well as about property (P7).
A syntactical λ-model (λ-model for short) is a pre-structure
verifying (P1)-(P5). A λ-model is called extensional if it veries
(P6). For a set E ∪{e} of λ-equations, we write E `λβ e (E `λβη
e) if e follows from e in the λβ- (λβη-) calculus, or equivalently
(by the completeness theorem [2]) , if A |=λ e for each λ-model
(extensional λ-model) A such that A |=λ E. We write `λβ e
(`λβη e) instead of ∅ `λβ e (∅ `λβη e)
We now come to the representation of λ-calculus in GFOL
with equality. Consider the GFOL term syntax (Var,Λ, ∅), whose
models have therefore the form (A, (AT )T∈Λ). We shall work with
the following GFOL formulae and schemes of formulae:7
(λx.T )T ′ = T [T ′/x] (β)
(λx.T )x = T (β′)
λx.T x = T, if x 6∈ FV(T ) (η)
λx.y x = y (η′)
(∀x.T1 = T2)⇒ λx.T1 = λx.T2 (ξ)
(∀x.T1 x = T2 x)⇒ T1 = T2, if x 6∈ FV(T ) (ext)
(∀x.y1x = y2x)⇒ y1 = y2 (ext′)
Note that we do not use the same notations as in Section 3.
7 Recall the conventions regarding axioms and axiom schemes.
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LEMMA 6. Each of the schemes of formulae (β), (η), (ext) is
semantically equivalent in GFOL to its primed variant.
Proof: Since (β′), (η′) and (ext) are instances of the schemes (β),
(η) and (ext), all we need to show is that the latter follow from the
former; and this simply holds because in our logic it is sound to
infer ϕ(T ) from ∀y.ϕ(y), and by the way substitution in formulae
was dened. 
This lemma points out that the side conditions in rule schemes such
as η and ext are not necessary (and these schemes in fact turn out
to be expressible as the single sentences η′ and ext′) as soon as
one has a framework where substitution from inside the logic is
distinguished from mere replacement into axiom schemes - the later
happens at the meta-level, outside the logic.
We dene a correspondence between pre-structures verifying
(P1)-(P4) and GFOL models satisfying ξ as follows:
• Each pre-structure verifying (P1)-(P4)L = (A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ)
is mapped to a GFOL model L# = (A, (AT )T∈Λ);
• Each GFOL modelM = (A, (AT )T∈Λ) satisfying ξ is mapped
to a pre-structure M$ = (A, 〈 〉, (AT )T∈Λ), where 〈 〉 is
dened by a〈b〉 = Axy(ρ), with ρ taking x to a and y to b.
PROPOSITION 5. The above two mappings are well dened and
mutually inverse. Moreover, they preserve satisfaction and they can
be restricted and corestricted to:
(a) λ-models versus GFOL models satisfying (ξ), (β);
(b) extensional λ-models versus GFOL models satisfying (ξ), (β), (η).
Proof: We show that L# is a GFOL model. Two of the GFOL
model axioms, (c).(i) and (c).(iii), are precisely (P1) and (P3). The
remaining axiom, (c).(ii), can be written asAT [T1/x1,...,Tn/xn](ρ) =
AT (ρ[x1 ← AT1(x1), . . . , ATn(xn)]). We check this by lexico-
graphic induction on two criteria: the depth of T , and then the
number n. The cases with T variable and T of the form T ′ T ′′ are
simple, and they use (P1) and (P2). Assume now that T has the
form λx.T ′. Since we work modulo α-equivalence, we can assume
that x is not free in any of T1, . . . , Tn.
• If x 6∈ {x1, . . . , xn}, then T [T/x] = λx.(T ′[T/x]). Thus we
need to checkAλx.(T ′[T/x])(ρ) = Aλx.T ′(ρ[x← AT (ρ)]). By
(P4), it is sufcient to consider a ∈ A and proveAT ′[T/x](ρ[x←
a]) = Aλx.T ′(ρ[x ← AT (ρ), x ← a]), i.e., AT ′[T/x](ρ[x ←
a]) = Aλx.T ′(ρ[x ← a][x ← AT (ρ)]), which is true by the
induction hypothesis applied to T ′ and ρ[x← a].
• If x ∈ {x1, . . . , xn}, say x = x1, then T [T/x] = T [T2/x2, . . . ,
Tn/xn] and by the induction hypothesis (second criterion),
T [T2/x2, . . . , Tn/xn] = AT (ρ[x2 ← AT2(x1), . . . , xn ←
ATn(xn)]. Finally, because x 6∈ FV(T ), the valuations ρ1 =
ρ[x ← AT (ρ)] and ρ2 = ρ[x2 ← AT2(x1), . . . , xn ←
ATn(xn)] coincide on FV(T ), hence, by (P3), AT (ρ1) =
AT (ρ2) and we are done.
(Above, we used the obvious tuple notations x for (x1, . . . , xn), T
for (T1, . . . , Tn) etc.) L# satises (ξ) because (P4) is nothing else
but a semantic statement of (ξ).
We show that M$ is a λ-model. Properties (P1) and (P3) are
required for generic models as well, hence they hold. (P2) holds
as an instance of the axiom (c).(ii) of GFOL models: AT1 T2(ρ) =
Ax1x2[T1/x1,T2/x2](ρ) = Ax1x2([ρ[x1 ← AT1(ρ), x2 ← AT2(ρ)]) =
AT1(ρ)〈AT2(ρ)〉. (We also used the denition of 〈 〉.) Again, (P4)
holds in M$ because M satises (ξ).
That # and $ are mutually inverse follows from the fact that
a〈b〉 = Axy(ρ), with ρ mapping x to a and y to b, holds in any
pre-structure verifying (P1)-(P4).
In order to see that the pre-structure is a λ-model (i.e., it also
veries (P5) iff the corresponding GFOL model satises (β), note
that (P5) is just a semantic statement of (β′), which is equivalent
to (β) by Lemma 6. Similarly, extensional λ-models correspond to
(β) ∪ (η)-GFOL models because of the following:
• under the (β), (ξ) assumptions, (η) is equivalent to (ext);
• (ext) is equivalent to (ext′) by Lemma 6;
• ext′) is just a semantic statement of (P6).
Finally, both # and $ preserve satisfaction since it has the same
denition for equations in pre-structures and generic models. 
COROLLARY 2. The GFOL theories (ξ) ∪ (β) and (ξ) ∪ (β) ∪
(η), or equivalently their more succinct versions (ξ) ∪ (β′) and
ξ∪ (β′)∪{(η′)}, are conservative extensions of the λβ- and λβη-
calculi. More precisely, for any two terms T1, T2 ∈ Λ,
(1) `λβ T1 = T2 iff (ξ) ∪ (β) `=GFOL T1 = T2,
(2) `λβη T1 = T2 iff (ξ) ∪ (β) ∪ (η) `=GFOL T1 = T2.
With roughly the same effort, we could prove:
PROPOSITION 6. LetC be a set of constants. For any setE∪{e} of
equalities over λ-terms with constants in C, E `λβ e iff E ∪ (ξ)∪
(β) `=GFOL e and E `λβη e iff E ∪ (ξ) ∪ (β) ∪ (η) `=GFOL e.8
We emphasize the fact that here we are not talking about a mere
encoding of λ-calculus in GFOL (as in the higher-order abstract
syntax approach [14]) but about an embedding of logics, both syn-
tactic and semantic. We do not require any auxiliary axiom. Thus
our formalism does not conceal the represented theory: simply by
watching its denition as a GFOL theory one would realize that it
is the λ-calculus, and by considering the generic models of this the-
ory one would see models for λ-calculus. The tiresome construc-
tions that we had to perform for preparing this representation were
needed because, as it was, the existing λ-calculus semantics was
not dressed up for receiving a visit of rst-order logic. The re-
sulting GFOL models satisfying (β) or (β) ∪ (η) can be seen as
alternative (complete) models for the λ-calculus.
6.3 System F
The syntactic categories of System F [6, 16] were already dened
(in the form of a two-sorted term syntax) in Subsection 3.4. These
coincide with those of System F as dened in the literature. For
the sake of completeness, we next consider, besides type constants
TConst (usually called basic types), also data constants forming a
set DConst. Thus type and data terms are given by:
TTerm ::= TVar | TConst | TTerm→ TTerm | Π TVar. TTerm
DTerm ::= DVar | DConst | DTerm DTerm |
λDVar : TTerm.DTerm | λ TVar.DTerm
We also assume a typing function tp : DConst→{Ground type
terms}. A typing context is a nite set of pairs {x1 : T1, . . . , xn :
Tn}, where the xi's are data variables and the Ti's are type terms,
and no data variable x appears twice in the set. Recall that x, y and
X,Y range over data variables and terms and t, t′ and T, T ′ over
type variables and terms. Γ will range over typing contexts and dc
over elements of DConst. We recall the classical Gentzen system
of typing rules for System F, meant to deduce typing judgements,
i.e., triples Γ . X : T . Unlike in Sections 4 and 5, where in rules
we wrote Γϕ for the union Γ∪ {ϕ}, we shall also use commas for
readability, thus writing Γ, ϕ for Γ ∪ {ϕ}.
8 Note that considering additional axioms E to λ-calculus does not make
much sense unless C 6= ∅.
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·
∅ . dc : tp(dc) [SF-DConstdc]
·
x :T . x : T [SF-Var]
Γ . X : T ′
Γ, x :T . X : T ′
[SF-AddVar]
Γ, x :T . X : T ′
Γ . (λx :T.X) : T → T ′ [SF-Abs]
Γ . X : T
Γ . (λt.X) : Πt.T
[SF-T-Abs]
Γ . X : T → T ′ Γ . Y : T
Γ . X Y : T ′
[SF-App]
Γ . X : Πt.T
Γ . X T ′ : T [T ′/t]
[SF-T-App]
At the rules [SF-AddVar] and [SF-Abs], (Γ, x : T ) is assumed
to be a typing context with x : T 6∈ Γ, i.e., it is assumed that x
is not in the left-hand side of any pair in Γ. At [SF-T-Abs], it is
assumed that t is not free in the right-hand side of any pair in Γ.
We let `SF Γ . X : T denote the fact that Γ . X : T is deducible
in the above system.
To keep up with the consideration of typed data constants, we
add to our GFOL specication SF from Subsection 3.4, for each
dc ∈ DConst, the following axiom:
typeOf (dc, tp(dc)) [DConstdc]
We henceforth call SF this enriched GFOL specication. The
next lemmas will bring SF closer to the classical denition of
system F.
LEMMA 7. For each two terms T, T ′ of sort type, SF `=GFOL
T = T ′ implies T = T ′ (i.e., T and T ′ are syntactically equal).
Proof: Easy induction on the depth of proof trees in G=; since
nothing is postulated about type equality, nothing non-trivial can
be inferred. 
According to the above lemma, the rule (Comp-typeOf ), of com-
patibility between typeOf and =, can be replaced in G= by the fol-
lowing rule, that we denote (DComp-typeOf ):
Γ . ∆, X = Y Γ . ∆, typeOf (X,T )
Γ, typeOf (Y, T ) . ∆
Γ . ∆
Because the cases of X and Y above being syntactically equal
is covered by the rule (Re) of reexivity for equality, we further
assume in (DComp-typeOf ) thatX 6= Y . Let G0= be G= without the
rule (Comp-typeOf ) and G1= be G0= together with (DComp-typeOf ).
Thus G1= is equivalent to G=. We shall prove that G1=, and hence
G=, is equivalent to G0=.
LEMMA 8. If Γ . ∆, X = Y is deducible in G0= andX 6= Y , then
there exists a unique type term T such that Γ . ∆, typeOf(X,T )
and Γ . ∆, typeOf(Y, T ) are deducible in G0=.
Proof: Easy induction on the depth of proof trees in G0=; the rules
(β), (η), (Tβ), (Tη), which might equate syntactically different
terms, make sure that the problematic term of the equality, hence
also the non-problematic one, has a type assigned. 
LEMMA 9. G0=, G1=, and G= are equivalent.
Proof: We need to show that the rule (DComp-typeOf ) can be
eliminated from G1=, i.e., it is sound for G0=. Thus assume that
Γ . ∆, X = Y and Γ . ∆, typeOf (X,T ) and Γ, typeOf (Y, T ) . ∆
are deducible in G0=, and that X 6= Y . Then T should be
the unique type from Lemma 8, and thus Γ . ∆, typeOf (Y, T )
is also deducible in G0=. And from Γ, typeOf (Y, T ) . ∆ and
Γ . ∆, typeOf (Y, T ) deducible, we get that Γ . ∆ is also de-
ducible in G0=. 
Let T SF be the GFOL theory (in the logic without equality)
consisting of the typing axioms of SF , namely of [DConstdc] for
each dc, [Abs], [App], [T-Abs], and [T-App].
LEMMA 10. SF is a conservative extension of T SF , i.e., for
each formula ϕ in GFOL without equality, SF `=GFOL ϕ iffT SF `GFOL ϕ.
Proof: According to Lemma 9, the rule (Comp-typeOf ) can be
eliminated from G=, and in the resulting Gentzen system there is
no rule that allows equalities to affect the typing formulae. Thus all
that can be deduced from SF about typings comes from T SF .
This informal argument can of course be made rigorous using
induction on the depth of proof trees in G0=. 
LEMMA 11. The theory T SF (in GFOL without equality) is fresh,
hence amenable.
Proof: The only sentence of T SF that has ai different from >
(see the denition of Freshness) is [Abs]. We thus need to check
that position 1 is persistent for typeOf . And indeed this is the case,
because:
- for [DConstdc] there is nothing to check;
- for the sentences [App], [T-Abs], [T-App], all the variables on
position 1 of typeOf in the hypotheses of the conditional equation
persist on position 1 of typeOf in the conclusion;
- for [Abs], if x occurs free inX , then persistency holds trivially; if
x does not occur free in X , then all the free variables on position 1
of typeOf in typeOf (X, t′), i.e., all variables in FV(X), persist on
position 1 of typeOf in typeOf (λx : t.X, t→ t′). 
We next state the correspondence between the original denition
of System F and our specication, w.r.t. typing. For each typing
context Γ = {x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn}, we let Γ# be the GFOL
formula typeOf (x1, T1) ∧ . . . ∧ typeOf (xn, Tn).
PROPOSITION 7. For all typing judgements Γ . X : T ,
`SF Γ . X : T iff SF `=GFOL Γ# ⇒ typeOf(X,T ).9
Proof: By Lemma 10, it is sufcient to prove T SF `GFOL Γ# ⇒
typeOf (X,T ) iff `SF Γ . X : T . According to Lemma 11, a
complete Gentzen system for T SF is the following, where Γ′
ranges over sets of GFOL formulae and where we use X : T as
9 Recall that we identify GFOL-formulae with their universal closures.
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just a short notation for typeOf (X,T ):
·
Γ′ . dc : tp(dc) [DConst]dc
Γ′, x :T . X : T ′
Γ′ . (λx :T.X) : T → T ′ [Abs]
Γ′ . X : T
Γ′ . (λt.X) : Πt.T
[T-Abs]
Γ′ . X : T → T ′ Γ′ . Y : T
Γ′ . X Y : T ′
[App]
Γ′ . X : Πt.T
Γ′ . X T ′ : T [T ′/t]
[T-App]
The side condition for [Abs] (coming from the Gentzen system K
of Section 5) is that x is a completely fresh variable. Similarly,
at [T-Abs] t should be completely fresh. These conditions can be
seen to coincide with those for [SF-Abs] and [SF-T-Abs] in the
case of Γ′ having the form Γ# for some typing context Γ (indeed,
one can show that in the latter rules, if x and t do not appear
free in Γ, then they do not appear free in the left-hand side of .
either; see [13]). Note also that in a backwards proof of Γ′ . ϕ,
if Γ′ has the form Γ#, i.e., comes from a typing context, then all
throughout the proof tree left-hand sides of sequents have this form
too. Finally, note that the SF-typing rule [SF-AddVar] would not
be necessary if one allowed arbitrary typing contexts instead of ∅ at
[SF-DConst]dc. Hence the two systems for typing, the original one
of SF, and the one coming from GFOL, are equivalent, implying
the desired result. 
We next recall some (complete) Henkin-style set-theoretical mod-
els for System F, similar to those introduced in [3]. The follow-
ing more amenable denition comes from [13] (although we use
slightly different notations). Below we let Tj denote the set of typ-
ing judgements and tj range over typing judgements.
A Henkin model H for System F is a a tuple (T ,F ,→,Π,
Itype, (Domτ )τ∈T , (Appτ,σ)τ,σ∈T , (Appf )f∈F , I), together with
a pair ((HT )T∈TTerm, (Htj)tj∈Tj,`tj), where:
(a)→: T × T → T ,
(b) Π : F → T ,
(c) F ⊆ T T ,
(d) Itype : TConst→ T ,
(e) Appτ,σ : Domτ→σ → DomσDomτ for each τ, σ ∈ T ,
(f) Appf : DomΠf →
Q
τ∈T Domf(τ) for each f ∈ F ,
(g) I : DConst→ SDom,
(h) HT : T TVar → T for each T ∈ TTerm,
(i) HΓ .X:T : {(γ, δ) ∈ T TVar × (SDom)DVar : for all x : T ′ ∈
Γ, δ(x) ∈ DomHT ′ (γ)} →
SDom for each Γ . X : T ∈ Tj
with `SF Γ . X : T ,
such that the following hold:
(1) I(dc) ∈ DomHtp(dc)(γ), for each dc ∈ DConst;
10
(2) Each of Appτ,σ and Appf is injective;
(3) (τ 7→ HT (γ[t← τ ])) ∈ F for each T, t, γ;
(4) Ht(γ) = γ(t) for each t ∈ TVar;
(5) Htc(γ) = Itype(tc) for each tc ∈ TConst;
(6) HT→T ′(γ) = HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ);
(7) HΠt.T (γ) = Π(τ 7→ HT (γ[t← τ ]));
10 The choice of γ turns out to be immaterial, thanks to the groundness of
tp(dc).
(8) HΓ .x:T (γ, δ) = δ(x)
(9) HΓ .XY :T (γ, δ) =
AppHT ′ (γ),HT (γ)(HΓ .X:T ′→T (γ, δ))(HΓ .Y :T ′(γ, δ));
(10) HΓ .XT :T ′[T/t](γ, δ) =
Appτ 7→HT ′ (γ[t←τ ])(HΓ .X:Πt.T ′(γ, δ))(HT (γ));
(11) HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ) ∈ DomHT (γ)→HT ′ (γ) and, for each
d ∈ DomHT (γ), AppHT (γ),HT ′ (γ)(HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ))(d) =
HΓ∪{x:T} .X:T ′(γ, δ[x← d]);
(12) HΓ .λt.X:Πt.T (γ, δ) ∈ DomΠ(τ 7→HT (γ[t←τ ])) and, for each
τ ∈ T , Appτ 7→HT (γ[t←τ ])(HΓ .λt.X:(Πt)T (γ, δ))(τ) =
HΓ .X:T (γ[t← τ ], δ).
Above
SDom denotesSτ∈T Domf(τ), σ, τ and d, d′ range over
elements of T and SDom, γ and δ range over elements of T TVar
and (
SDom)DVar, and τ 7→ HT (γ[t ← τ ]) denotes the function
that maps each τ to HT (γ[t← τ ]).
In [13], one rst denes an applicative structure to be a tuple
(T ,F ,→,Π, Itype, (Domτ )τ∈T , (Appτ,σ)τ,σ∈T , (Appf )f∈F , I)
where the items in the tuple are as at points (a)-(g), satisfying
requirement (1) above; such a structure is extensional if it sat-
ises requirement (2); then a Henkin model is dened to be an
extensional applicative structure for which the items in the pair
((HT )T∈TTerm, (Htj)tj∈Tj,`tj), dened, in terms of properties (3)-
(12) above, are total functions. Note that if such total functions
exist, they are unique, hence we can assume them as part of the
Henkin model structure, therefore our denition is just a rephras-
ing of the one in [13].
The satisfaction relation between Henkin models H and well-
typed equations Γ . X = Y : T (with `SF Γ . X : T and
`SF Γ . X : T ) is dened by H |=SF Γ . X = Y : T iff
HΓ .X:T = HΓ .Y :T .
To avoid entering technical details irrelevant for this paper, we
assume non-emptiness of types (without such an assumption, the
above Henkin models are not complete for System F, but only if
one considers a richer language - see [13]). In order to show the
Henkin models equivalent to our GFOL models, we shall perform
a series of transformations on the latter. Given three setsA,B,C, a
mapping f : A×B → C is called extensional if for all a, a′ ∈ A,
if f(a, b) = f(a′, b) for all b ∈ B then a = a′. Below, the
satisfaction relation for 1-,2-,3-, and 4- Henkin models is dened
similarly to that for Henkin models.
The rst transformations are:
• Consider each Appτ,σ not as an injective mappingDomτ→σ →
DomσDomτ , but as an extensional mapping Domτ→σ ×
Domτ → Domσ;
• Consider each Appf not as an injective mapping DomΠf →Q
τ∈T Domf(τ), but as an extensional mapping DomΠf ×T → SDom such that for each (d, τ) ∈ DomΠf × T ,
Appf (d, τ) ∈ Domf(t);
• Consider in F only mappings of the form τ 7→ HT (γ[t← τ ])
for some T ∈ TTerm, t ∈ TVar and γ ∈ T TVar; only this kind
of mappings are used in the Henkin model denition, and thus
in the denition of satisfaction;
• Assume all Domτ and Domσ , with τ 6= σ, mutually disjoint;
this obviously does not affect the satisfaction relation.
We thus obtain the following equivalent models for System F:
A 1-Henkin model H is a a tuple
(T ,F ,→,Π, Itype, (Domτ )τ∈T , (Appτ,σ)τ,σ∈T , (Appf )f∈F , I),
together with a pair ((HT )T∈TTerm, (Htj)tj∈Tj,`tj), where:
(a)→: T × T → T ,
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(b) Π : F → T ,
(c) F ⊆ T T , F = {τ 7→ HT (γ[t ← τ ]) : T ∈ TTerm, t ∈
TVar, γ ∈ T TVar},
(d) Itype : TConst→ T ,
(e) Appτ,σ : Domτ→σ ×Domτ → Domσ for each τ, σ ∈ T ,
(f) Appf : DomΠf × T →
SDom for each f ∈ F ,
(g) I : DConst→ SDom,
(h) HT : T TVar → T for each T ∈ TTerm,
(i) HΓ .X:T : {(γ, δ) ∈ T TVar × (SDom)DVar : for all x : T ′ ∈
Γ, δ(x) ∈ DomHT ′ (γ)} →
SDom for each Γ . X : T ∈ Tj
with `SF Γ . X : T ,
such that the following hold:
(1) Domτ ∩ Domσ = ∅ whenever τ 6= σ;
(2) I(dc) ∈ DomHtp(dc)(γ), for each dc ∈ DConst;
(3) Each of Appτ,σ and Appf is extensional, and Appf (d, τ) ∈
Domf(t) for all (d, τ) ∈ DomΠf × T ;
(4) Ht(γ) = γ(t) for each t ∈ TVar;
(5) Htc(γ) = Itype(tc) for each tc ∈ TConst;
(6) HT→T ′(γ) = HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ);
(7) HΠt.T (γ) = Π(τ 7→ HT (γ[t← τ ]));
(8) HΓ .x:T (γ, δ) = δ(x)
(9) HΓ .XY :T (γ, δ) =
AppHT ′ (γ),HT (γ)(HΓ .X:T ′→T (γ, δ), HΓ .Y :T ′(γ, δ));
(10) HΓ .XT :T ′[T/t](γ, δ) =
Appτ 7→HT ′ (γ[t←τ ])(HΓ .X:Πt.T ′(γ, δ), HT (γ));
(11) HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ) ∈ DomHT (γ)→HT ′ (γ) and, for each
d ∈ DomHT (γ), AppHT (γ),HT ′ (γ)(HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ), d) =
HΓ∪{x:T} .X:T ′(γ, δ[x← d]);
(12) HΓ .λt.X:Πt.T (γ, δ) ∈ DomΠ(τ 7→HT (γ[t←τ ])) and, for each
τ ∈ T , Appτ 7→HT (γ[t←τ ])(HΓ .λt.X:(Πt)T (γ, δ), τ) =
HΓ .X:T (γ[t← τ ], δ).
LEMMA 12. Henkin and 1-Henkin models are equivalent, in that
there exists a satisfaction- preserving and reecting surjection &1
between the class of Henkin models and that of 1-Henkin models.
That is to say: for all Henkin models H and well-typed equation
Γ . X = Y : T , H |= Γ . X = Y : T iff H&1 |= Γ . X = Y :
T .
Proof: The mapping &1 makes disjoint copies of the Domσ's
whenever necessary, curries the functions Appσ,τ and Appf , and
deletes from F all functions that do not come from terms. &1 pre-
serves and reects satisfaction because satisfaction only considers
functions in F that come from terms, and hence it relays on the
same structure for H as for H&1 . &1 is a surjection because any
Henkin model with disjoint domainsDomσ and all functions com-
ing from terms yields a 1-Henkin model by uncurring. 
For the next modication we do not introduce a new model name.
We simply assume that the 1-Henkin models have the mappings
Π and→ injective. It is conceptually straightforward that by taking
this assumption we obtain equivalent models. Indeed, any 1-Henkin
model H with non-injective Π and→ can be transformed, without
affecting the satisfaction relation, into one with injective Π and
→, by tagging the results of these mappings applications with the
arguments.
We next simplify the 1-Henkin models by getting rid of their
functional component F . We base this simplication on the fact
that, by the injectivity of Π, we can replace the index f of App with
HΠt.T (γ), where f ∈ F has the form τ 7→ HT (γ[τ ← t]).
A 2-Henkin model H is a a tuple
(T ,→, Itype, (Domτ )τ∈T , (Appτ,σ)τ,σ∈T , (Appτ )τ∈T , I), to-
gether with a pair ((HT )T∈TTerm, (Htj)tj∈Tj,`tj), where:
(a)→: T × T → T is an injective mapping,
(b) Itype : TConst→ T ,
(c) Appτ,σ : Domτ→σ ×Domτ → Domσ for each τ, σ ∈ T ,
(d) AppHΠt.T (γ) : DomHΠt.T (γ) ×T →
SDom for each γ, t, T ,
(e) I : DConst→ SDom,
(f) HT : T TVar → T for each T ∈ TTerm,
(g) HΓ .X:T : {(γ, δ) ∈ T TVar × (SDom)DVar : for all x : T ′ ∈
Γ, δ(x) ∈ DomHT ′ (γ)} →
SDom for each Γ . X : T ∈ Tj
with `SF Γ . X : T ,
such that the following hold:
(1) Domτ ∩ Domσ = ∅ whenever τ 6= σ;
(2) I(dc) ∈ DomHtp(dc)(γ), for each dc ∈ DConst;
(3) Each of Appτ,σ and AppHΠt.T (γ) is extensional, and
AppHΠt.T (γ)(d, τ) ∈ DomHT (γ[t←τ ]) for each t, T, γ and (d, τ) ∈DomHΠt.T (γ) × T ;
(4) Ht(γ) = γ(t) for each t ∈ TVar;
(5) Htc(γ) = Itype(tc) for each tc ∈ TConst;
(6) HT→T ′(γ) = HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ);
(7) HΓ .x:T (γ, δ) = δ(x)
(8) HΓ .XY :T (γ, δ) =
AppHT ′ (γ),HT (γ)(HΓ .X:T ′→T (γ, δ), HΓ .Y :T ′(γ, δ));
(9) HΓ .XT :T ′[T/t](γ, δ) =
AppHΠt.T ′ (γ)(HΓ .X:Πt.T ′(γ, δ), HT (γ));
(10) HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ) ∈ DomHT (γ)→HT ′ (γ) and, for each
d ∈ DomHT (γ), AppHT (γ),HT ′ (γ)(HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ), d) =
HΓ∪{x:T} .X:T ′(γ, δ[x← d]);
(11) HΓ .λt.X:Πt.T (γ, δ) ∈ DomHΠt.T (γ) and, for each τ ∈ T ,
AppHΠt.T (γ)(HΓ .λt.X:(Πt)T (γ, δ), τ) = HΓ .X:T (γ[t← τ ], δ).
LEMMA 13. 1-Henkin and 2-Henkin models are equivalent, in that
there exist two satisfaction- preserving and reecting mappings &12
and &21 between the two classes of models.
Proof: &12 maps a 1-Henkin model to a 2-Henkin model by forget-
tingF and Π and by dening AppHΠt.T (γ) to be Appτ 7→HT (γ[τ←t]);
the denition is correct by property (7) in the denition of 1-
Henkin models. Conversely, &21 maps a 2-Henkin model to a 1-
Henkin model by dening F as at point (c) in the denition of
1-Henkin models, and Appf by AppHΠt.T (γ) if f has the form
τ 7→ HT (γ[t ← τ ]). Satisfaction is seen to be precisely the same
in corresponding 1-Henkin and 2-Henkin models. 
Next we atten the multi-typed domain Dom of 2-Henkin models.
The attening is based on the following:
• The multi-typing of Dom can be viewed as a relation typeOf
between data and types;
• Due to the type-wise disjointness of the domain and the in-
jectivity of →, the families of mappings (Appτ,σ)τ,σ∈T and
(Appτ )τ∈T can be replaced by two mappings App :
SDom×SDom → SDom and TApp : SDom × T → SDom,
with postulating the necessary typing restrictions; since App
and TApp will be total functions, we allow them to be applied
outside the areas designated (Appτ,σ)τ,σ∈T and (Appτ )τ∈T
too, but this does not affect the satisfaction relation.
A 3-Henkin model H is a a tuple (T ,D,→,App, TApp, Itype, I,
typeOf ) together with a pair ((HT )T∈TTerm, (Htj)tj∈Tj,`tj), where:
(a)→: T × T → T is an injective mapping,
(b) App : D ×D → D,
(c) TApp : D × T → D,
(d) Itype : TConst→ T ,
(e) I : DConst→ D,
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(f) typeOf ⊆ D × T ,
(g) HT : T TVar → T for each T ∈ TTerm,
(h) HΓ .X:T : {(γ, δ) ∈ T TVar × DDVar : for all x : T ′ ∈
Γ, typeOf (δ(x), HT ′(γ))} → D for each Γ . X : T ∈ Tj with
`SF Γ . X : T ,
such that the following hold:
(1) {d ∈ D : typeOf (d, τ)} ∩ {d ∈ D : typeOf (d, σ)} = ∅ when-
ever τ 6= σ;
(2) typeOf (I(dc), Htp(dc)(γ)), for each dc ∈ DConst;
(3) For each τ, σ, d, d′, if typeOf (d, τ → σ) and typeOf (d′, τ)
then typeOf (App(d, d′), σ);
(4) For each t, T, γ, τ, d, if typeOf (d,HΠt.T (γ)) then
typeOf (TApp(d, τ), HT (γ[t← τ ]));
(5) For each τ, σ, App is (τ, σ)-extensional, i.e., for each d, d′
with typeOf (d, τ → σ) and typeOf (d′, τ → σ), if App(d, d′′) =
App(d′, d′′) for all d′′ with typeOf (d′′, τ) then d = d′;
(6) For each T, t, γ, TApp is HΠt.T (γ)-extensional, i.e., for each
d, d′ with typeOf (d, τ) and typeOf (d′, τ), if TApp(d, σ) = TApp(d′, σ)
for all σ, then d = d′;
(7) Ht(γ) = γ(t) for each t ∈ TVar;
(8) Htc(γ) = Itype(tc) for each tc ∈ TConst;
(9) HT→T ′(γ) = HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ);
(10) HΓ .x:T (γ, δ) = δ(x)
(11)HΓ .XY :T (γ, δ) = App(HΓ .X:T ′→T (γ, δ), HΓ .Y :T ′(γ, δ));
(12) HΓ .XT :T ′[T/t](γ, δ) = TApp(HΓ .X:Πt.T ′(γ, δ), HT (γ));
(13) typeOf (HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ), HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ)) and, for
each dwith typeOf (d, HT (γ)), App(HΓ .λx:T.X:T→T ′(γ, δ), d) =
HΓ∪{x:T} .X:T ′(γ, δ[x← d]);
(14) typeOf (HΓ .λt.X:Πt.T (γ, δ), HΠt.T (γ)) and, for each τ ∈ T ,
App(HΓ .λt.X:(Πt)T (γ, δ), τ) = HΓ .X:T (γ[t← τ ], δ).
LEMMA 14. 2-Henkin and 3-Henkin models are equivalent, in that
there exist two satisfaction- preserving and reecting mappings &23
and &32 between the two classes of models.
Proof: Let H be a 2-Henkin model. The 3-Henkin model &23(H)
is dened as follows: D = SDom. App(d, d′) = Appτ,σ(d, d′)
if there exist τ, σ such that d ∈ Domτ and d′ ∈ Domσ
and App(d, d′) arbitrary otherwise; the denition is correct be-
cause, thanks to disjointness of the Domτ 's and injectivity of
→, there can be at most one pair (τ, σ) as above. Similarly,
TApp(d, τ) = AppHΠt.T (γ)(d, τ) if there exist t, T, γ such that d ∈DomHΠt.T (γ). The relation typeOf is the following: typeOf (d, τ)
iff d ∈ Domτ . Everything else remains the same.
Conversely, let H be a 3-Henkin model. The 2-Henkin model
&32(H) is dened as follows: Domσ = {d ∈ D : typeOf (d, σ)}.
Appτ,σ is the restriction and corestriction of App to Domτ→σ ×
Domτ → Domσ; the correctness of this denition is ensured
by property (3) in the denition of 3-Henkin models. Similarly,
TAppHΠt.T (γ) is the restriction and corestriction of TApp toDomHΠt.T (γ)×T → D, with correctness ensured by property (4)
in the denition of 3-Henkin models. Everything else remains the
same.
Note that &32◦α23 is the identity mapping, thus 2-Henkin models
are somehow more concise than 3-Henkin models. Again, there
is nothing to prove about preservation an reection of satisfaction,
since again the satisfaction relation is the same in two correspond-
ing models. 
We are now ready to eliminate typing judgements from the seman-
tics. The following lemma shows that typing judgements are se-
mantically redundant:
LEMMA 15. Let H be a 3-Henkin model, γ : TVar → T and
δ : DVar → D. Then there for any two pairs (Γ, T ) and (Γ′, T ′)
such that ` Γ . X : T and ` Γ′ . X : T ′ such that HΓ . X:T and
HΓ′ . X:T ′ are dened on (γ, δ), it holds that HΓ . X:T (γ, δ) =
HΓ′ . X:T ′(γ, δ).
Proof: Easy induction on the derivation of typing judgements;
the idea is that all the information needed for interpreting X is
already in the valuation (γ, δ), and Γ and T can only conrm
this information. 
Based on this lemma and on the fact that satisfaction is not affected
by allowing interpretations of data terms that cannot type, we
obtain some further equivalent models:
A 4-Henkin modelH is a a tuple (T ,D,→,App, TApp, Itype, I, typeOf )
together with a pair ((HT )T∈TTerm, (HX)X∈DTerm), where:
(a)→: T × T → T is an injective mapping,
(b) App : D ×D → D,
(c) TApp : D × T → D,
(d) Itype : TConst→ T ,
(e) I : DConst→ D,
(f) typeOf ⊆ D × T ,
(g) HT : T TVar → T for each T ∈ TTerm,
(h) HX : T TVar ×DDVar → D for each X ∈ DTerm,
such that the following hold:
(1) {d ∈ D : typeOf (d, τ)} ∩ {d ∈ D : typeOf (d, σ)} = ∅ when-
ever τ 6= σ;
(2) typeOf (I(dc), Htp(dc)(γ)), for each dc ∈ DConst;
(3) For each τ, σ, d, d′, if typeOf (d, τ → σ) and typeOf (d′, τ),
then typeOf (App(d, d′), σ);
(4) For each t, T, γ, τ and d with typeOf (d,HΠt.T (γ)), it holds
that typeOf (TApp(d, τ), HT (γ[t← τ ]));
(5) For each τ, σ, App is (τ, σ)-extensional, i.e., for each d, d′
with typeOf (d, τ → σ) and typeOf (d′, τ → σ), if App(d, d′′) =
App(d′, d′′) for all d′′ with typeOf (d′′, τ) then d = d′;
(6) For each T, t, γ, TApp is HΠt.T (γ)-extensional, i.e., for each
d, d′ with typeOf (d,HΠt.T (γ)) and typeOf (d′, τ), if TApp(d, σ) =
TApp(d′, σ) for all σ, then d = d′;
(7) Ht(γ) = γ(t) for each t ∈ TVar;
(8) Htc(γ) = Itype(tc) for each tc ∈ TConst;
(9) HT→T ′(γ) = HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ);
(10) Hx(γ, δ) = δ(x)
(11) HXY (γ, δ) = App(HX(γ, δ), HY (γ, δ));
(12) HXT (γ, δ) = TApp(HΠt.T ′(γ, δ), HT (γ));
(13) If typeOf (Hλx:T.X(γ, δ), HT (γ)→ HT ′(γ)) and
typeOf (d, HT (γ)), then App(Hλx:T.X(γ, δ), d) = HX(γ, δ[x←
d]);
(14) if typeOf (Hλt.X(γ, δ), HΠt.T (γ)) then App(Hλt.X(γ, δ), τ) =
HX(γ[t← τ ], δ).
It should be clear that 4-Henkin models are essentially two-sorted
GFOL models satisfying SF , modulo a discussion similar to the
one we had on untyped λ-calculus. Note also that now we can
eliminate the disjointness assumption (1), as well as the injectivity
assumption about→, since these would not affect the satisfaction
of GFOL Horn clauses with conclusion referring to data, the only
ones that we are interested in. We can thus state the following
result:
PROPOSITION 8. There exist the mappings # and $ (obtained by
composition of all intermediate mappings) between the class of
Henkin models of System F and the class of GFOL models of SF
such that, for all Γ, X, Y, T with `SF Γ . X :T and `SF Γ . Y :
T , the following hold:
(1) H |=SF Γ . X = Y : T iff H# |=GFOL Γ# ⇒ X = Y ;
(2) M |=GFOL Γ# ⇒ X = Y iff M$ |=SF Γ . X = Y : T .
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Moreover, for a setEq∪{Γ . X = Y :T} of well-typed equations,
Eq `SF Γ . X = Y :T iff SF `GFOL Γ# ⇒ X = Y .
Propositions 7 and 8 show the equivalence, both syntactical
and semantical, of System F with Henkin semantics and its GFOL
representation. Another way to view these results is the following:
thanks to the completeness of GFOL and of the Henkin semantics
for System F, the theory SF can derive any typing or equational
property of System F; thus the implicit GFOL models of SF
provide complete set-theoretical models for System F, alternative
to the System F - specic Henkin models.
6.4 A Formula-Typed Logic
We next briey discuss a new rst-order logic, whose terms have
formulae in bindings, as another instance of GFOL. This could
be seen as a generalization of typed λ-calculus, where one can
specify the domain type of a function by using arbitrary rst-
order formulae. In this logic, terms and formulae are dened by
mutual recursion. The free variables of a term accumulate the free
variables in the formulae in their bindings as well.
Let Σ = (Var,Σ,Π) be a rst-order language. The sets Term
and Formula of terms and formulae, are dened as follows:
Term ::= Var | Σ(Term, . . . , Term) | Term〈Term〉
λVar :Formula. Term
Formula ::= Term = Term | pi(Term, . . . , Term) | ¬Formula
Formula ∧ Formula | ∀Var.Formula
The production Term ::= Σ(Term, . . . , Term) has the restriction
that the number of arguments match the arity of the operation in Σ.
Below x, σ, T, T ′, Ti, and ϕ, χ range over variables, operation
symbols in Σ, terms, and formulae, respectively. Two operators
FV , associating to each term or formula, the set of its free vari-
ables, are dened mutually recursively as follows: FV(x) = {x};
FV(σ(T1, . . . , Tn)) = FV(T1) ∪ . . . ∪ FV(Tn); FV(T 〈T ′〉) =
FV(T ) ∪ FV(T ′); FV(λx : ϕ.T ) = (FV(T ) ∪ FV(ϕ)) − {x};
FV(T = T ′) = FV(T ) ∪ FV(T ′); FV(pi(T1, . . . , Tn)) =
FV(T1) ∪ . . . ∪ FV (Tn); FV(ϕ → χ) = FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(χ);
FV(ϕ ∧ χ) = FV(ϕ) ∪ FV(χ); FV(∀x.ϕ) = FV(ϕ)− {x}.
Note that in a term λx :ϕ.T , λx binds all the free occurrences
of x in both ϕ and T . Substitution is dened as expected, and terms
together with FV and substitution satisfy our axioms for a term syn-
tax. Moreover, even though formulae were dened recursively to-
gether with the terms, they are still nothing but rst-order formulae
over the terms, hence they fall into the framework of GFOL. Such
a logic with a very exible type system (types are dened by arbi-
trary formulae) can be used to specify various typed lambda calculi
where types can be themselves axiomatized; e.g., domain-specic
types, such as measurement units [11]. Also, it could elegantly in-
corporate abstract data types, by taking advantage of the formulae
from bindings, but this goes beyond the scope of our paper. Note
that the second-order nature of the logic is completely encapsulated
in the term structure, thus this logic, as any instance of GFOL, is
completely axiomatizable in a rst-order style.
7. Concluding remarks
We dened a generic FOL (GFOL) in which terms are axioma-
tized by common properties of their free variables and substitution,
together with a complete deduction system. Several other logics
and calculi were dened as theories in GFOL, thus borrowing not
only generic semantics from GFOL, but also complete deduction
systems. We believe that GFOL can serve as a foundational deni-
tional framework for most of the calculi and logics in current use.
We have only investigated denitional aspects in GFOL. It would
be interesting to also study computational, or operational, aspects
of the resulting GFOL theories: can equations and some relations
such as typeOf be executed, e.g., via rewriting, and thus obtain
a framework for operational or executable semantics of program-
ming languages?
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